Thailand's military junta to delay elections to 2016 - is anyone surprised?

Originally published at Siam Voices on November 28, 2014

In the immediate aftermath of the military coup of the May 22 earlier this year, there was some early hope by rather optimistic (but ultimately naive) observers that this hostile takeover of powers would be just a "speed bump" or a "slight setback" for Thailand's democracy. The hope was that, as with the previous coup in 2006, powers would be returned to a quasi-civilian government that would organize fresh democratic elections within a year.

However, the 2006 military takeover failed to purge the political forces of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, with his sister Yingluck taking power in 2011, only to be ousted earlier this year. This time the military junta, led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, has been particularly cagey (as mentioned here) about the near- and mid-term future of Thailand's political discourse - particularly about when elections will take place - so much so that the piercing questions by the media at one press conference provoked a walk-out by the junta leader.

In the weeks following that the junta set the agenda: the so-called "roadmap" sees "reconciliation" by the "reform process" as a main pretext before democratic elections can be eventually held. Now six months after the coup, with the establishment of a fully junta-appointed ersatz-parliament called the "National Legislative Assembly" (more than half stacked with active and retired military officers), a fully junta-appointed "National Reform Council" tasked with making reform recommendations, and the rather exclusive "Constitutional Drafting Committee", the institutional bodies for the junta's political groundwork have been set, joined by a cabinet of ministers that is largely the same as the military junta at the top.

The junta said that, all going to plan, elections could be possible in late 2015. However, that prospect is now very unlikely:

Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, who is also defense minister, said elections will take place in 2016, citing groups opposed to the junta, or National Council for Peace and Order, as it is formally known, as one reason for the delay.

"We will be able to organize elections around the start of 2016 once the constitution is drafted," Prawit told reporters. "Right now there are elements opposed to the National Council for Peace and Order."

"Thai election pushed back to 2016: deputy PM", Reuters, November 27, 2014

This should come as NO surprise to even the casual observer. There have been quite a few times already that a delay of elections has been hinted at. Here they are in reverse chronological order:

Speaking to the BBC's chief business correspondent Linda Yueh, [Thai finance minister Sommai] Phasee said that from his conversations with Gen Prayuth "I think it may take, maybe, a year and a half" for elections to be held.

He said both he and the prime minister wanted to see an end to martial law, but that it was still needed now "as his tool to deal with security".

"Thailand elections 'could be delayed until 2016'", BBC News, November 27, 2014

[สัมภาษณ์กับนายเทียนฉาย กีระนันทน์ ประธานสภาปฏิรูปแห่งชาติ (สปช.)]

"กฎหมายลูกที่ต้องร่างเพิ่มเติมภายหลังได้รัฐธรรมนูญจะใช้เวลาเท่าไร บอกไม่ได้ ตอบได้เพียงว่าไม่นาน รวมเวลาการทำหน้าที่ของสปช.ทั้งหมดน่าจะห้อยไปถึงปี '59"

[Interview except with Thienchay Keeranan, President of the National Reform Council]

"How much time it will take to amend the constitution [for a referendum] once this is set - I cannot say. I can only say that it won't take long, the work of the National Reform Council will be done by 2016."

"แนวทางปฏิรูป-กรอบร่างรัฐธรรมนูญ - สัมภาษณ์พิเศษ", Khao Sod, October 27, 2014

Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha (...) said on Wednesday that elections planned for 2015 will depend on whether wide-ranging national reforms can be completed within a year.

"I outlined a roadmap. The election must come with a new constitution and eleven reform areas," said Prayuth. "Everything depends on the roadmap so we must see first if the roadmap can be completed. Elections take time to organize," he added, giving no further details.

"Leader of Thai junta hints at delay in return to elections", Reuters, October 15, 2014

The actual reasons for the delay are pretty simple: the so-called "reform" plans by the junta - aimed at marginalizing the electoral power of Thaksin Shinawatra's political forces even at the cost of disenfranchising nearly half the electorate - are apparently taking longer than initially believed, despite all the government institutions being dominated by its political allies.

Furthermore, martial law is still in place in order to quash any form of opposition, seen this past week (read here and here). It is these public displays of dissent that the junta will use as a pretense to claim that "reconciliation" hasn't been achieved yet and thus an election cannot be held under the present circumstances. At risk of sounding like  broken record, the real problem isn't the fact that there is opposition to the military junta, it is rather that the opposition is banned from expressing it publicly  - if at all, it should be done silently, says the junta.

The junta's attitude to its commitment to the "roadmap" (and a lot of other things) can be summed up by what junta Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister (and largely assumed main backer of the coup) General Prawit Wongsuwan said earlier this month at a press conference after a case of junta interference in the media (we reported):

I would like to remind the media that the government, the NCPO are currently in the process to achieve reconciliation in this country. Everything that is an obstacle to reconciliation… everything that will create divisions – we won’t let that happen! Let it rest, wait for now. [...] so wait… for a year! We have our roadmap, the government, the NCPO are following it, they’re following their promise. So why the hurry?!

Why the hurry indeed when you cannot be actually held accountable for missing the deadline...?

28 weeks later in post-coup Thailand: Some personal thoughts

Originally published at Siam Voices on November 22, 2014 Hindsight is a tricky thing. It is the understanding of something only after it has already occurred. You may anticipate or predict it, but getting a truly clear picture of what has happened mostly is something that is visible after the fact.

In the case of Thailand in the past 12 months, however, the deterioration from dysfunctional and disrupted democracy to an unashamedly military dictatorship only confirmed our deepest fears that a military coup and thus the regression back to darker, more authoritarian times was something unfortunately never completely out of the question.

Who would have thought at this time one year ago that the self-inflicted, massive political own-goal by the ruling Pheu Thai Party of then-Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, full of hubris and total miscalculation, would spark the large, sustained anti-government protest, ultimately paved the way for the military coup?

The hostile takeover of power on May 22, 2014 was a watershed moment in Thailand’s modern history - and it was not for being the 12th such military coup the country has suffered since 1932. It was the consequential execution of what the Thai military thinks the lesson of their last coup in 2006 was: that it failed to remove the political forces of former Prime Minister (and Yingluck’s older brother) Thaksin Shinawatra. In other words: the hindsight of the Thai army is that their 2006 coup wasn’t good enough!

And now, six months - or 28 weeks - later, the Thai military junta is in firm control of the discourse, both politically and publicly.

The military-installed political bodies are intended to permanently re-shape the power structure in the foreseeable future. The fact that then-army chief and junta leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha is now also prime minister  - and thus not only remaining the face of the coup but also representing Thailand on the international stage - indicates a thoroughly sustained and even increased presence of the military in politics.

It has also set off a persistent, revisionist re-imagineering of Thailand’s society, complete with a ‘Happiness Campaign’ to win back the hearts and minds it has intimidated (and still is), and a revamped education curriculum that focuses on teaching ”12 values” in order to create a new Thai generation that is good at following, but not at leading.

But while this re-imagineering of ‘Thainess’ might have worked a few decades ago, it is unlikely to work this time for a number of reasons: the political crisis in the past decade has been so polarized that both military coups have unnecessarilyy antagonized its opponents, mostly groups that are either pro-Thaksin or pro-democracy - or both (yes, that’s possible too)!

Furthermore, assisted by the internet and social media, Thais are now less likely to hide their animosities in public, especially when they feel that their right to express themselves may be taken away. Hopefully some of those that protested for the previous government to be removed, and gleefully rejoiced when that eventually happened, will have the hindsight to see that they have bet on the wrong horse.

This week alone saw sporadic and small flashes of dissent, as students activists flashed the three-finger-salute made popular by 'The Hunger Games' movies. And yet it was enough to send the junta into a panicked frenzy, detaining everyone showing the sign and sending them for ”attitude-adjustment”, even forcing a movie chain to drop the blockbuster from its program and sending police officers to patrol screenings.

It is evident from the reactions this week alone that this is a junta that regards disagreement as division, dissent as damaging, differences as disharmony, and defiance as dangerous.

It is telling that deputy prime minister General Prawit Wongsuwan said essentially that the junta graciously allow the right to disagree with them, ”but they cannot express that” publicly. Let that sink in: freedom of thought is apparently allowed, freedom of speech is not…! Even with the hindsight of knowing of the widespread backlashes (not to mention the bad PR) it is unlikely they would have acted any different, since force and intimidation are the only methods the military know to maintain order.

And that is basically what we have been dealing with in the past 28 weeks: A military dictatorship hellbent on changing the political system in its very own way solely for the purpose of permanently locking out their political enemies, even if it means to disenfranchise a huge part of the country, so that it could only lead to more dissatisfaction in the future. And with that mindset - and the help of the still ongoing martial law - it will force it on all of us.

This Thai military coup will have short- and mid-term ramifications, but they can never take control of the long-term implications nor escape the consequences - the future direction of Thailand hinges on the willingness to actually learn from this potential future hindsight.

________________________ The 28 Weeks Later series – Thailand 6 months after the coup:

Introduction: 28 weeks later in post-coup Thailand Part 1: Economic stability comes at a cost under Thailand’s military junta Part 2: Prayuth, censorship and the media in post-coup Thailand Part 3: An education fit for a zombie? Part 4: Are Thai people really happy after the coup? Part 5: Thailand’s junta and the war on corruption Part 6: PDRC myths and Thailand's privileged 'new generation' Part 7: Thailand tourism down, but not out Part 8: Education reform in Thailand under the junta Part 9: 28 weeks later in post-coup Thailand: Some personal thoughts

28 weeks later: Prayuth, censorship and the media in post-coup Thailand

Originally published at Siam Voices on November 18, 2014 Since his time as army chief, General Prayuth Chan-ocha’s relationship with the media has been strenuous at best. Now as the coup leader and prime minister he constantly in the limelight, and his gaffes are under more scrutiny than ever. On the other hand, the media itself is facing stringent censorship.

Reporter 1: [...] so it will be sorted very soon in order to have elections, right?

Prayuth: [inaudible]…see my first answer, I already said it.

Reporter 1: General, may I ask another question: are you now the prime minister?

Prayuth: [pause] It is in progress…I don’t know yet, we’ll see, keep calm! [points to the reporter] You wanna be it?

Reporter 1: [sarcastically] YES, YES, YES…!

Prayuth: Ok, that’s enough! Thank you very much…

Reporter 2: General, just a quick question…how long will the timeline, roadmap take until a new election?

Prayuth: As long as the situation returns to normal!

Reporter 2: General, [the public] may be asking themselves how long’s gonna take, whether if it’s one year…

Prayuth: It depends of the situation! I don’t have an answer. There’s no set time!

Reporter 2: …or one year and a half…

Prayuth: …we’re controlling the situation as fast as possible! Enough! [walks off]

Reporter 2: So do you mean then…General? General…?!

That scene took place when then-army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha held a press conference shortly following the confirmation of him as coup leader by royal command on May 26, 2014 - just a few of days after Thailand’s military has seized absolute power in a coup.

For Prayuth, this was a fairly typical exchange with the media. We have previously pointed out his strenuous relationship with the press here and here - more often than not resulting in the general lashing out at a reporter, resorting to sardonic remarks or simply walking out of a press briefing.

However, that exchange on the May 26 (see full clip here) and what followed shortly after that would set the tone for the coming months: The two reporters from that press conference, Thai Rath’s Supparerk Thongchaiyasit and Bangkok Post’s military correspondent Wassana Nanuam (whose relationship with the top brass has been often brought into question), were summoned and chastised by the military junta for their ”aggressive” hounding of the junta leader.

It was an early sign that the military junta was assuming full control of the press and thus also claiming the sovereignty of the narrative. Mainstream media outlets are put under heavy scrutiny by the “National Council for Peace and Order” (NCPO) as the junta officially calls itself. It has created monitor watchdogs dedicated to each medium in order to check that nobody is breaching the junta’s orders aimed at curtailing criticism against the NCPO. Also, the military government has taken on social media platforms for perceived coup-critical and anti-monarchy content, reportedly having installed a system for mass online surveillance.

And yet, with the General himself - now the leader of Thailand's military government - constantly in the limelight, he still continues to deliver one gaffe after another too tempting for most of media not to report about it. From a seemingly endless stream of gaffes (see a ”best”-of list from September here), here are three examples:

• Amid potential protests by rubber farmers facing falling prices, Gen. Prayuth flippantly suggested that they may have to sell their rubber ”on Mars!” That remark attracted widespread attention on social media with many photoshopping the junta leader into satirical images - so much so that the junta told people to stop it!
• Visibly annoyed by a follow-up question from a Thai journalist aking whether he prefers to seize power via a coup than by elections, Prayuth simply threatened: ”You be careful, or else I’ll slam you with this podium…!” (Full video HERE.)
• Prayuth's statements weren't just picked up by local media. Following the murder of two British tourists on the island of Koh Tao (and the subsequent bumbling police investigation) - Gen. Prayuth’s poorly-worded suggestion that Western tourists, especially bikini-wearing ones, might only be safe in Thailand "when they’re not beautiful!” made international headlines. After much public outcry for this inappropriate remark, he apologized.

As we mentioned, there are a lot more examples of the junta leader putting his foot in his mouth. The continuous stream of gaffes is indicative of a massive PR headache with Gen. Prayuth and the military junta, even though it seems that the former is resistant to advice - that is if he gets any, despite close aides reportedly worried about his ‘loose canon’ nature. And if he’s not being sardonic, he comes across as an annoyed uncle in his weekly TV addresses, seemingly knowing the answers to most of the nation’s problems.

However, the conditions most Thai journalists are currently working under are no laughing matter, no matter how many verbal (and other) fouls the junta is committing. Several journalists have either been directly or indirectly pressured by the military junta for their critical reporting.

Last week, ThaiPBS dropped a TV discussion program after it aired criticism of the junta, seemingly after a visit from army officers voicing their displeasure. The program’s host has also been "temporarily” pulled off-air . This has sparked a campaign by most of the mainstream media to protest against the military’s interference. Even the otherwise tepid and often silent Thai Journalists'Association has joined the chorus calling for restrictions on the media to be lifted.

The military has denied accusations of censorship and says it would never limit press freedom - only then to threaten the media from crossing the line. And that exactly is the problem: with the military junta claiming solid sovereignty of its narrative and almost everything else in the political discourse it can easily move the undefined and invisible line to suit its needs.

And if you need any further evidence of the military junta’s open contempt towards the media, just listen to Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit Wongsuwan - for many the real mastermind behind the coup - responding to the demands in a press conference on Monday (full clip HERE):

The policy of the NCPO is…let me put it this way: I would like to remind the media that the government, the NCPO are currently in the process to achieve reconciliation in this country. Everything that is an obstacle to reconciliation… everything that will create divisions - we won’t let that happen! Let it rest, wait for now. We have the National Reform Council, the National Legislative Assembly - they’re currently at work, so wait… for a year! We have our roadmap, the government, the NCPO are following it, they’re following their promise. So why the hurry?!

________________________ The 28 Weeks Later series – Thailand 6 months after the coup:

Introduction: 28 weeks later in post-coup Thailand Part 1: Economic stability comes at a cost under Thailand’s military junta Part 2: Prayuth, censorship and the media in post-coup Thailand Part 3: An education fit for a zombie? Part 4: Are Thai people really happy after the coup? Part 5: Thailand’s junta and the war on corruption Part 6: PDRC myths and Thailand's privileged 'new generation' Part 7: Thailand tourism down, but not out Part 8: Education reform in Thailand under the junta Part 9: 28 weeks later in post-coup Thailand: Some personal thoughts

Siam Voices series: 28 weeks later in post-coup Thailand

Originally published at Siam Voices on November 17, 2014

”I’m sorry, but I have to seize power.”

These were the words spoken by army chief General Prayuth Chan-Ocha on May 22, 2014 before he left the conference room at around 5pm, leaving a good amount of people stunned and moments later detained by military police. Among them were representatives of the ruling Pheu Thai government - or rather what was left of it after Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was ousted shortly before - and the leaders of the anti-government protests.

Both sides were brought to the table with the military styling itself as an intermediary, after it had declared martial law two days earlier. It was the climax of a political protest campaign against the government of Yingluck Shinawatra that lasted for over half a year. What was initially a rally against an overzealous blanket amnesty bill (which was so broad it even managed to upset their own red shirts supporter base) by the opposition Democrat Party led by veteran political brawler Suthep Thuagsuban morphed into an all-out destructive movement solely aimed at toppling a democratically elected government.

The occupation of public roads, sieges of government buildings and the successful sabotaging of the February 2 snap-elections brought parts of the capital Bangkok and Thailand’s entire political discourse to a standstill. At least 28 people, both protesters and security forces, were killed in numerous violent clashes during the protests.

Thailand’s 12th successful military coup quickly made clear that this hostile takeover of power was going to be a quite different one than the previous coup in 2006. Because unlike last time, where the rule was quickly returned to a quasi-civilian government, the establishment of an ersatz-rubber stamping parliament called the ”National Legislative Assembly” dominated by military officers, a highly partisan ”National Reform Council” and a rather exclusive ”Constitutional Drafting Committee” shows that the 2014 version is set to fundamentally change Thailand’s political discourse - and there’s still no end in sight and no clear sign what the end result will look like.

The military rulers, with recently retired army chief Gen Prayuth carrying on as junta leader and prime minister, are also making sure that this process remains unhindered. Hundreds of people, among them politicians, activists, academics and journalists have been summoned by the junta - some of them detained, some others charged. The press and social media are under heavy censorship and surveillance. Dissidents are being silenced, while the coup supporters are celebrating silently.

It has been roughly a year since the anti-government protests that have paved the way for the coup begun, and it has been 6 months since the military coup itself. It is time to take a look back in order to understand what’s next for Thailand.

This week the Siam Voices team will analyze and comment on the developments after 6 months in post-coup Thailand, and what they mean for politics, economy and society in the Southeast Asian nation.

_______________

The 28 Weeks Later series – Thailand 6 months after the coup:

Introduction: 28 weeks later in post-coup Thailand Part 1: Economic stability comes at a cost under Thailand’s military junta Part 2: Prayuth, censorship and the media in post-coup Thailand Part 3: An education fit for a zombie? Part 4: Are Thai people really happy after the coup? Part 5: Thailand’s junta and the war on corruption Part 6: PDRC myths and Thailand's privileged 'new generation' Part 7: Thailand tourism down, but not out Part 8: Education reform in Thailand under the junta Part 9: 28 weeks later in post-coup Thailand: Some personal thoughts

Thailand's post-coup constitution: Familiar faces, uncharted territory

Originally published at Siam Voices on November 5, 2014 Thailand nominates committee to draft its new constitution, but can the next charter bridge the nation's fractious political divides?

Last week we looked at the Thai military junta's attempts to 'reform' the political system by highlighting the role of the National Reform Council (NRC), a 150-strong body tasked with making reform recommendations covering a wide rage of issues including political, administrative, social, economic and other areas. It also plays an essential role in forming the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) by appointing most of its members (20) and, more importantly, approving the draft for the new constitution after a process taking several months (we have also explained a possible loophole to indefinitely restart the process).

This week, we look more closely at the Constitutional Drafting Committee, now that all 36 members have been nominated, and what exactly it is being tasked with.

While the NRC was debating whether or not to include people from outside, (namely former political stakeholders such as members from the ousted ruling Pheu Thai Party and their red shirt supporters, or the opposition Democrat Party - all largely sidelined since the military coup) in the end vehemently rejecting this idea, the other government bodies have fielded their CDC nominations with less buzz: the military-dominated ersatz-parliament National Legislative Assembly (NLA) and the junta cabinet of ministers and the junta itself, officially called the “National Council for Peace and Order” (NCPO), have appointed five members each.

The NCPO also chose the chairman of the CDC: Borwornsak Uwanno, law professor at Chulalongkorn University and secretary-general of the King Prajadhipok Institute. Borwornsak was previously a member of the 1997 constitution drafting committee, widely regarded as the "People's Constitution" pushing Thailand towards democracy, having the majority of its drafters elected by the people (!) back then. That is a stark contrast to the 2014 constitution drafting process - junta leader and prime minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha has reportedly picked all the cabinet's nominations for the CDC "by himself".

Unsurprisingly, like all the other military government bodies, the CDC nominations show no non-partisanship either. The news website Prachatai has counted at least 7 CDC candidates that were actively involved or have supported the anti-government protests that began last year and ended with military coup of May 22. The rallies led by Suthep Thuagsuban and other veteran politicians of the Democrat Party paralyzed parts of Bangkok for weeks and also sabotaged the February 2 snap-elections.

So, what can we expect from the next charter? Article 35 of the current interim constitution (translation available here) offers a glimpse of what is to come:

Section 35. The draft Constitution shall cover the following matters: (1) the principle of being one and indivisible Kingdom; (2) the democratic regime of government with the King as the Head of State which is suitable for Thai context; (3) the efficient mechanism for prevention, examination and suppression of corruption in both public and private sectors, including mechanism to guarantee that State powers shall be exercised only for national interest and public benefit; (4) the efficient mechanism for prevention of a person whom ordered by a judgment or any legal order that he commits any corruption or undermines the trustworthiness or fairness of an election from holding any political position stringently; (5) the efficient mechanism which enabling State officials; especially a person holding political position, and political party to perform their duties or activities independently and without illegal manipulation or mastermind of any person or group of persons; (6) the efficient mechanism for strengthening the Rule of Law and enhancing good moral, ethics and governance in all sectors and levels; (7) the efficient mechanism for restructuring and driving economic and social system for inclusive and sustainable growth and preventing populism administration which may damage national economic system and the public in the long run; (8) the efficient mechanism for accountable spending of State fund which shall be in response of public needs and compliance with financial status of the country, and the efficient mechanism for audit and disclosure of the spending of State fund; (9) the efficient mechanism for prevention of the fundamental principle to be laid down by the new Constitution; (10) the mechanism which is necessary for further implementation for the completion of reform.

The Constitution Drafting Committee shall deliberate the necessity and worthiness of the Constitutional Organs of, and other organizations to be established by the provisions of, the new Constitution. In case of necessity, measures to ensure the efficient and effective performance of each organization shall be addressed.

While somewhat vague in its wording, the motivations behind it are pretty clear: a self-proclaimed crusade against "corrupt" politicians and even a constitutionally enshrined restriction of "populist" policies utilized by the previous governments associated with former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Some other CDC members (to remind you, as of now officially not confirmed yet!) are thinking out loud of some other ideas including curtailing the power of political parties in the future or preventing banned politicians from running for office again - a clear indication of the military junta's goal to hinder yet another election victory by a Thaksin-associated party as much as possible.

"My hope is that the new constitution will put a stop to past divisions and that the public will be as involved in its drafting as possible," Gen. Prayuth was quoted in the media. However, the partisanship of all government bodies under the military junta makes it clear yet again that the so-called "reform process" will not include all sides of the political spectrum - it's quite an one-sided raw deal for everyone (naively) hoping for a quick return to democracy in Thailand.

Unlike the last constitution in 2007, there will be no referendum on the next constitution. So the earliest point in time the Thai people will have any say in the political discourse will most likely be at the next elections, as promised by the military junta to be held some time late 2015 - or not!

Thailand's post-coup 'reform' process: Only a few 'good' men at the helm

Originally published at Siam Voices on October 30, 2014 The "reform" plans by Thailand's military government continue to take shape. After the establishment of the so-called National Reform Council, a Constitutional Drafting Committee will be created soon. But developments in both groups suggest again that any attempts to revamp the political system will be a very exclusive, one-sided affair.

In the immediate aftermath of the military coup of May 22, one of the often-cited reasons for the hostile takeover was the "need" to reform Thailand's political system, which was later extended to a desire to eventually create a "true democracy" that may or may not include democratic elections at the end of 2015. Apart from those that were against the toppled government of prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra - and a few of them actively helping to pave the way for the coup - it was clear to most people that it meant that the military junta would change the rules to its own liking.

The actions of the military junta have continued to show that: Then-army chief and junta leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha became prime minister thanks to the confirmation by a rubber stamping, all-appointed ersatz-parliament called the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), which is stacked mostly with military officers. Also, the recent inauguration of the National Reform Council (NRC) and soon the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) are indicative that the country's "reform" process is an exclusive one.

The junta-drafted interim constitution (full translation available HERE) initially mandated a 14-member selection committee to pick 250 members for the National Reform Council. But the junta - thus the country's entire military top command - then decided to do all the appointing by itself, basing it on Article 30.6 that basically makes the selection committee redundant since in the end the junta makes the call anyway.

Despite previous pledges by Gen. Prayuth that "people from all walks of life" will be included among the reportedly almost 7,000 applicants, the final members' list is rather unsurprising:

Critics have lambasted the 173 selected members of the National Reform Council (NRC) tasked with 11 areas of reform for their affiliations with the military regime after a list of names was leaked to the media.

The Pheu Thai Party and red shirts have voiced concern that the National Council for Peace and Order's (NCPO) reform process will fail because the list is made up largely of regime sympathisers and lacks representation from a cross-section of groups in society. Meanwhile, opponents of the previous government and members of the yellow-shirt group praised the NRC's composition, saying it comprises experts in various fields and is not dominated by the military.

The leaked list includes several former members of the anti-Thaksin Group of 40 Senators, such as Rosana Tositrakul, Kamnoon Sitthisamarn, Phaiboon Nititawan and Wanchai Sornsiri. Academics on the council are noted sympathisers of the People's Democratic Reform Committee [the anti-government protesters that paved the way for the coup], including Charas Suwannamala and Chuchai Supawong.

"NRC picks stir barrage of criticism", Bangkok Post, September 30, 2014

The National Reform Council - whose members don't have to reveal their assets, by the way (unlike their NLA colleagues) - has mainly two tasks: First, it is supposed to make recommendations to, well, reform a good dozen of targeted areas including politics, social issues, education, administration and economy. That also includes drafting bills for the NLA to vote on.

Secondly, it also is an important component for the drafting of a new constitution (remember, we currently only have an interim one). The NRC can send 20 members to the so-called Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), while the NLA, the junta cabinet and the junta itself can appoint five members each (the latter also decides on the CDC chairman).

There was some speculation that the NRC might appoint people outside their ranks to join the CDC, in order to include those political stakeholders that have been largely excluded for the entirety of the political process since the coup, mainly the main political parties (Democrat and Pheu Thai) and their supporter groups (e.g. the red shirts). The rationale behind that idea was to show that the 'reform' process isn't solely an 'inside job', but actually an inclusive one with people across the spectrum represented.

However, that idea had at best a snowball's chance in hell and it was overwhelmingly struck down in a vote on Tuesday, with most opponents saying it's the "NRC's duty" and getting former political stakeholders would only "negatively affect" the drafting process. In the end, the NRC voted 20 of their own people into the CDC on Wednesday, mostly comprised of persons that are politically aligned to the junta.

The NRC's essential role in the drafting process of the next constitution is that it's going to approve the CDC's draft after a set time limit of 120 days (Article 34). However, should it fail to do so, the CDC will be dissolved and a new one will be created (Article 38). Even harsher, should the NRC either fail to decide on the draft within 15 days or flat out reject it, BOTH the NRC and the CDC will be dissolved, its members sacked and new ones will be filled for both groups (Article 37). The worst case scenario could result in multiple loops of NRCs and CDCs being created and sacked until there's eventually a new constitution everybody's happy with - practically the junta's version of Groundhog Day!

What all these developments show is that the so-called 'reform' process initiated by Thailand's military junta is nothing but a smokescreen for a short-sighted, one-sided revamp of the political system, aimed at excluding their political rivals at the risk of disenfranchising at least half the country. By mainly sticking to themselves, the men and women in the National Legislative Assembly, the National Reform Council and the Constitutional Drafting Committee are the manifestation of yet another monopoly of power under Thailand's new military government that will only create more opposition than there already is.

Also, NRC president Thienchay Keeranan recently said in an interview that he's open to put the constitution draft up for a referendum (even though there are no such plans as of now) and that he anticipates the NRC's work to be completed by 2016, despite another council member previously saying that the NRC should exist "no longer than one year." However, that coincides with recent hints by junta leader and prime minister Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha's that elections might be postponed into 2016, thus extending the junta's reform roadmap to their vision of a "true democracy".

It looks like the few 'good' men deciding about Thailand's future are going to stay a little bit longer than promised.

The US scales down "Cobra Gold" military exercises in Thailand

Originally published at Siam Voices on October 27, 2014

A crucial part in the military junta's desire to win approval from the international community are its current ties to the United States. But the signs between Washington and Bangkok are somewhat ambiguous right now, writes Saksith Saiyasombut.

It was a calm morning on the empty Hat Yao beach near Pattaya overlooking the Gulf of Thailand, but it was clear it wasn't going to stay that way for long. On the horizon, a good dozen amphibious landing vehicles appeared, racing towards the shoreline owned by the Thai Navy. Things were about to get louder and more crowded as the vehicles unloaded several units of United States Marines onto the beach as part of the annual "Cobra Gold", the oldest multinational military exercise in the Asia-Pacific region.

Established in 1982, "Cobra Gold" was initiated to strengthen ties between the United States and their long-term ally Thailand, then under the semi-democratic rule of Prem Tinsulanonda, now the head of the Privy Council. It was the height of the Cold War and there were fears of a communist threat in the region. Over the years, the focus has shifted from fending off hypothetical invasions to multinational humanitarian operations. The exercise also involves other armed forces in the region either as participants or observers, including China and more recently Burma. These annual "war games" drills are seen as an essential pillar of US-Thai relations.

16,000 troops took part in the "Cobra Gold" military exercise in February when Thailand still had an elected, but deeply embattled civilian government. Now, almost half a year after the military coup of May 22 and with the military junta at the helm of the country and its fundamental dismantling of the political system, the question remains whether there will be another "Cobra Gold" in 2015. And what of Thai-US ties?

The United States have warned of “negative implications for the U.S.–Thai relationship, especially for our relationship with the Thai military,” and suspended $3.5m of military aid to Thailand in the immediate aftermath of the coup (still a drop in the ocean compared to the current military budget of $6.07bn). There also have been demands that "Cobra Gold" should either be cancelled or moved out of Thailand in order to send a strong signal to the Thai generals. While these demands have been the only direct punishments--if you can call them that--from Washington it was still enough for the Thai junta to appear "unfazed" and offended at the same time.

As mentioned previously on this blog, the military junta is desperately seeking approval from the international community to legitimise their rule. Despite the rather symbolic sanctions and condemnations by the US and the European Union who have suspended an almost-signed agreement on closer economic and political ties, the Thai junta seems to have found new friends in Burma, Cambodia (the former literally welcoming them with open arms) and also in China.

In light of this, what will the US' next response be? It seems like they're actually shaking one of the US-Thai diplomatic pillars:

A spokesperson for the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok told VOA on Friday the so-called Cobra Gold 2015 exercise set for February will be "refocused and scaled down." The statement said "in light of the current political situation, the U.S. government has increased its focus on non-lethal activities, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief."

Thai officials have recently denied that the war games would be affected by the May coup, the military's 12th takeover in 80 years, which has caused a minor rift in U.S.-Thai relations. Supreme Commander General Worapong Sanga-net said this week that 2015 was long ago set as the year for "light military exercises." He said the 2016 version will be designated as "heavy, and prove the exercises have not been affected by the coup." For his part, Worapong said the reduced U.S. participation was not an indictment of the military takeover.

"US Scales Back 'Cobra Gold' War Games in Thailand", Voice of America, October 24, 2014

The US is also reported to have cancelled a “large-scale live fire exercise tied to a planned amphibious landing,” similar to the one described in the introduction.

As evident in the comments of Supreme Commander General Worapong Sanga-net above, one key element of selling their view of international relations to the public is copious amount of spin, literally bending and distorting the truth. This was evident in the vastly different accounts of a meeting between Thai junta prime minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha and Japan's prime minister Shinzo Abe by their respective news agencies.

Whether Thais fully believe them or not, the junta is eager to pose with foreign dignitaries and maintain a level of involvement on the international stage - such as forums such as the Asia-Europe Meeting in Milan earlier this month - in order to show that there is business as usual in Thailand. It seems that normalizing ties to the military government is the pragmatic way to go for many foreign diplomats, since they believe they can better influence the junta that way.

With US Ambassador Kristie Kenney leaving Thailand at the end of this month (and her successor yet to be determined), the United States should take a hard look at the current situation and think about the long-term consequences of a change in their relations to Thailand. A stance that is too tough could drive Thailand into the arms of China while being too soft could be seen as an endorsement of the junta. But any response should demonstrate that things in Thailand are far from normal and the general's words about when they  may return to normal should not be trusted.

Thai junta leader in Europe 'to collect stamps of approval'

Originally published at Siam Voices on October 16, 2014

Thai junta Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha will meet leaders of the European Union for the first time since the military coup this week in a self-proclaimed mission to help Western leaders "understand" the political situation in Thailand. But there is no guarantee that it is going to work, writes Saksith Saiyasombut

One of the many life lessons one will learn is that you simply can't win over everyone. That's something that Thailand's military government seems to be struggling to cope with, especially when it comes to foreign policy towards the West. Observing the reaction from Thai prime minister and junta leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha and members of his cabinet shows a curious split in narrative wobbling back and forth between desperately seeking approval and snide dismissal when it comes with dealing criticism abroad.

In the immediate aftermath of the military of coup in May 2014, many countries around the world (to varying degrees) expressed their "grave concerns" about the worst-case scenario. Some condemned the hostile takeover of power and others also added a demand for a "rapid" or "immediate" return to democratic principles and elections.

Western countries reacted initially the harshest at the sight of Thailand's second coup d'etat in eight years: United States Secretary of State John Kerry said that the coup would have "negative implications for the U.S.–Thai relationship, especially for our relationship with the Thai military." This was emphasized with the US' suspension of military aid to Thailand worth $3.5m - which is a drop in the ocean compared to the $6.07bn military budget the junta gave itself for next year's budget. The European Union (EU) seemingly went slightly further, stopping all visits to Thailand and suspending the signing of an agreement on closer economic and political ties - an apparent downgrade in EU-Thai relations.

The Thai junta, seemingly offended and also appearing unfazed at the same time, has turned to other countries in the region by seeking closer ties to China, as evident in the approval of a $23bn train network connecting the two countries. But the Thai junta's China pivot could turn out to be a zero-sum game in the long-term. Neighboring countries like Burma and Cambodia have welcomed the Thai generals (literally!) with open arms and gave their blessings to the junta as well, which should alarm ASEAN despite their long-held tradition of non-intervention.

It was evident that the Thai junta and the military government (which is essentially one and the same) had an unsurmountable uphill task to convince the international community that their (vague, but yet so clear) intentions to "reform" the political system are sincerely for a return "swift" return to "true democracy" with elections held sometime in late 2015 - which may or may not be postponed further back into 2016, depending on whether or not their "reform" plans actually stick.

The hardest part still remains the Western head of states and diplomats. The appointment of recently retired supreme commander General Thanasak Patimaprakorn as foreign minister - much to the chagrin of several diplomats - certainly didn't help to raise the diplomatic credibility of the military government either.

His first big mission was at the United Nation General Assembly in New York last month, where General Thanasak was spouting the usual claims by the Thai junta that it is "not retreating from democracy," but that the military intervention was "necessary" amidst the deteriorating political conflict (while absolutely disregarding the manufactured nature of the anti-government protests that made the coup possible in the first place!).

Now his boss has boarded the plane and after making his first visit as Thai junta prime minister to neighboring Burma, General Prayuth Chan-ocha is visiting Europe this week. More specifically, he is attending the 10th Asia-Europe Meeting in the northern Italian city of Milan on Thursday and Friday.

This marks a curious turn of events after the (in hindsight rather soft) sanctions and nearly universal condemnation from the West as General Prayuth will be meeting EU leadership with Herman Van Rompuy, recently elected President of the European Council, and EU Commission President Jose-Manuel Barroso, as well as heads of states from both Europe and Asia.

The main goal of this trip is clear: thaw frozen Thai-EU relationships and get back to business - literally! Thailand is poised to position itself in a leading role in ASEAN and being the EU-ASEAN coordinator in July 2015 certainly helps - especially with the launch of the ASEAN Economic Community looming around the corner.

But is normalizing relations with a Thai military government that is anything but democratic the right way to go?

"The reason why we're seeking to engage [with the junta] is that this is the best way to get our points across," a source within the diplomatic community in Bangkok told Asian Correspondent. "We have ways to pressure them on certain issues. However, we are aware what impression this might give to the public."

Indeed, the problem is that any engagements by foreign envoys with the junta could appear to give them legitimacy.

"Prayuth is coming here to collect his stamps of approval," said Junya Yimprasert, an exiled Thai political activist, at a panel this past weekend at the Asia-Europe Peoples' Forum (AEPF) in Milan*. Junya, who is organizing a protest of General Prayuth's presence at ASEM on Thursday (which the Thai Foreign Ministry has anticipated), has called for ASEM not to let the Thai junta prime minister take part, which was echoed in the final declaration of the AEPF (PDF).

As Prayuth will be attending ASEM and meeting the same European leaders that have condemned him months ago, he will still have a tough time to convince everybody that it's time to get back to normal (and it might take even longer, according to his own words).

Since he launched the military coup, assumed absolute power and sat about completely overhauling the political system, things in Thailand are far from being normal. You don't have to be a foreign diplomat to figure that out. This time, Prayuth won't be able to convince everybody.

*(Disclaimer: This author was one of the panelists at the Asia-Europe Peoples' Forum at the invitation of the Asienhaus Foundation.)

Why are some opinion poll results so positive about the Thai junta?

Originally published at Siam Voices on September 24, 2014

”The streets are quiet, there are no protests and people are happy!”

This is a common justification of the military coup in Thailand. And often - despite apparent ongoing repression of dissent - the proponents of the army's actions base these claims on the results of opinion polls.

A couple of months ago we highlighted the flawed fallacy of taking opinion poll results as a serious indicator of the mood among Thais and what they think of the current political situation, especially about the junta and their work.

Apart from the general problems with Thai opinion polls (i.e. dodgy methodology and phrasing, small sample sizes, questions about representation etc.), the circumstances since the coup - such as the crackdown on criticism on the street, online and in the media - are discouraging people from expressing their true feelings:

According to one pollster, a number of respondents refused to be interviewed when asked about their political views for fear that they would be “summoned” by the junta.

As a result, the respondents are dominated by either yellow-shirt supporters or people who are politically neutral, said the source, who requested anonymity because he was not authorised to talk to the press.

Mainstream polls have provided glowing praise of the performance of the National Council for Peace and Order since it seized power on May 22, amid orders curbing freedom of expression of the media and anti-coup protesters.

”NCPO ‘deterring’ honest opinion polls”, Bangkok Post, August 3, 2014

Besides the likely skewed results by the established opinion poll institutes like ABAC, Bangkok University and Suan Dusit (whose results and methods have been also often criticized in the past), a new organization is raising suspicion with findings such as this:

Up to 95 per cent of the public support junta chief and PM-elect Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha as the prime minister, the Master Poll survey has found. The survey was carried out by Thai Researchers in Community Happiness Association among leaders of 622 communities around the country on Friday and Saturday.

"Prayuth receives public overwhelming support as PM: survey", The Nation, August 24, 2014

The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has gained increased popularity since it seized power in May with latest poll by the Thai Researchers in Community Happiness Association revealing the junta's popularity now rises to 81 percent from 70.1 percent.

"Military junta’s popularity rises", ThaiPBS, September 22, 2014

The "Master Poll" surveys (no reason given why they're called that) are conducted by the Thai Researchers in Community Happiness Association (TRICHA), which emerged very shortly after the military coup on May 22, 2014. Its first poll on June 14 right away found that 80.8 per cent among 1,209 people are "happier" ever since the hostile takeover.

Other surveys in the past couple months included asking 599 people about the weekly Friday evening TV address by outgoing army chief, junta leader and Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha (90 per cent are watching it regularly! 95 per cent like it!) or asking a diminutive sample size of 424 moviegoers if they liked the junta-organized screenings of the of the fifth installment of the nationalistic, dramatized biopic series of the 16th-century King Naresuan - guess what: 93.7 per cent of them came out "happier" because they got to see a movie for free!

Not only are nearly all results of their "Master Poll" surveys suspiciously overwhelmingly positive towards the junta, despite a relatively small sample size (in most cases below a 1,000), but also the sudden appearance of TRICHA itself shortly after the coup does raise some questions.

In a message on TRICHA's website (in which the survey results are in Thai, but everything else oddly is in English), it states that, "As one of private companies in Thailand, (...) the Master Poll and Policy, Co., Ltd. plays a leadership role as one of the country’s organizations for academic research and policy making." (sic!) This message is signed by an unnamed "Association's Chief", whose profile on the website is empty as of writing, as are many other sections.

A look at the website's domain registration reveals that both masterpoll.net and tricha.net are registered to Mr. Noppadon Kannika, who has also been occasionally named as TRICHA's director in the Thai press (e.g. here). According to his bio from his Alma Mater University of Michigan (where he graduated in Survey Methodology), he was director of the ABAC Poll Research Center and has held "some official positions," including one at the Royal Thai Army - indeed, he has been research advisor to the commander-in-chief in the past.

According to his profiles on Twitter and LinkedIn, he left ABAC to pursue another Master degree at Georgetown University in Strategy and Policy Management, while his Twitter bio still links to ABAC Poll, but has been regularly tweeting news articles about the "Master Poll" results. The masterpoll.net domain was registered on May 15, 2014 - one week before the military coup. That could be just a coincidence. However, Mr. Noppadon's LinkedIn page lists the "Royal Thai Army" as his current employer while his job title is, according to himself, "unknown"!

Given the relative lack of information on the TRICHA's website, the apparently suspicious career choice its director made recently and ultimately a bunch of questionably one-sided survey results are ultimately clear indicators that these are very weak foundations to base an universal assessment of the Thai people's happiness - especially in the current political climate where only very few options and opinions are tolerated.

7 observations about Thailand's new, junta-picked cabinet

Originally published at Siam Voices on September 1, 2014 One hundred days after Thailand's military launched a coup and toppled the elected government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the establishment of an interim constitution, a so-called "National Legislative Assembly" (NLA) and its appointment of army chief and Thai junta leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha as prime minister, Thailand now has an interim cabinet.

King Bhumibol Adulyadej endorsed the cabinet on Saturday and the names were published in the Royal Gazette on late Sunday afternoon (PDF), thus making the announcement official. This marks another step by the “National Council for Peace and Order” (NCPO), as the junta calls itself, in its proclaimed roadmap to substantially "reform" Thailand's political system and to bring what they say is "true democracy" that will result in elections some time late 2015.

Here's the list of the 33 members of the cabinet "Prayuth 1":

• Prime Minister: Gen. Prayuth Chanocha
• Deputy Prime Ministers: Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan, MR Pridiyathorn Devakula, Yongyuth Yutthawong, Gen. Tanasak Patimapragorn, Wissanu Kruea-Ngam
• Defense: Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan, Gen. Udomdej Sitabutr (deputy)
• Interior: Gen. Anupong Paochinda, Suthi Makbun (deputy)
• Foreign Affairs: Gen. Tanasak Patimapragorn, Don Pramudwinai (deptuy)
• Justice: Gen. Paiboon Koomchaya
• Finance: Sommai Phasi
• Transport: ACM Prajin Juntong, Akom Termpitayapaisit (deputy)
• Energy: Narongchai Akrasanee
• Commerce: Gen. Chatchai Sarikalya, Apiradi Tantraporn (deputy)
• Industry: Chakkamon Phasukvanich
• Education: Adm. Narong Pipatanasai, Lt.-Gen. Surachet Chaiwong (deputy), Krissanapong Kiratikorn (deputy)
• PM's Office: ML Panadda Diskul, Suwaphan Tanyuvardhana
• Social Development and Human Security: Pol.-Gen. Adul Saengsingkaew
• Public Health: Rachata Rachatanavin, Somsak Chunharas (deputy)
• Labor: Gen. Surasak Kanjanarat
• Culture: Veera Rojpojanarat
• Natural Resources and Environment: General Dapong Ratanasuwan
• Science and Technology: Pichet Durongkaveroj
• Tourism and Sports: Kobkarn Wattanavrangkul
• Information and Communication Technology (MICT): Pornchai Rujiprapa
• Agriculture: Peetipong Phuengbun na Ayutthaya

Here are some observations of the new Thai junta cabinet, in no particular order:

1. Timing of the not-so-subtle signs

As with many other announcements and decisions made by the military junta, it was really just a matter of time before the cabinet would be announced - albeit on a relatively short notice. This time however, the signs in the run-up to the announcement were quite obvious: the resignation of several National Legislative Assembly members such as Narongchai Akrasanee (now Energy Minister), Kobkarn Wattanavrangkul (Tourism) and Ratchata Rachtanavin (Public Health) within a week signaled that a finalized cabinet line-up was imminent, since according to the interim constitution one cannot be both. On top of that they're joined by Pornchai Rujiprapa (MICT) and Gen. Surasak Kanjanarat (Labor), who resigned from the boards of the state-owned energy company PTT and the public broadcaster MCOT, respectively. Also, Pridiyathorn Devakula and Wissanu Kruea-Ngam have quit the board of Post Publishing (who brings out the Bangkok Post among others) to become the new deputy prime ministers.

While it may surprise some that the announcement was made on a Sunday afternoon, the crucial date of August 31 wasn't such a surprise. Not only can the new cabinet get right onto work on Monday, September 1, but it also allows some crucial decisions to be made that are due this coming month: the 2015 budget draft is set to be rubber stamped by the NLA and, more importantly, the annual reshuffle of military officers is taking place this month. Not only can the military leadership further cement its position by demoting any potential dissenting officers and promoting loyalists, it also doesn't have deal with any opposition in the Defense Council anymore, since all seven positions (defense minister, his deputy, permanent secretary for the defense, supreme commander and the chiefs of army, navy and the air force) are filled with military men.

2. Double duty for a very green cabinet

Among the 33 cabinet members, 13 of them hold military or police ranks - practically the entire upper echelon of the Thai military are at the table: besides army chief and PM Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, there are his predecessors Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan (now dep.-PM and Defense) and Gen. Anupong Paochinda (Interior), his deputy army chief Gen. Udomdej Sitabuir (dep. Def.-Min.), assistant army chiefs Gen. Paiboon Koomchaya (Justice) and General Chatchai Sarikalya (Commerce), supreme commander Gen. Tanasak Patimapragorn (dep.-PM and Foreign Affairs), air force chief ACM Prajin Jaunting (Transport), navy chief Adm. Narong Pipatanasai (Education), permanent secretary for defense Gen. Surasak Kanjanarat (Labor) and deputy army chief of staff Lt.-Gen. Surachet Chaiwong (dep. Edu.-Min.).

The military is occupying the key ministries, especially concerning economics and national security - including the appointment of National Intelligence Agency director Suwaphan Tanyumvardhana (who reports directly to Gen. Prayuth, the junta chief and now also to Gen. Prayuth, the PM) as minister of the PM's office. Also, with Prawit and Gen. Anupong are two key persons behind the prolonged anti-government protests that enabled the military coup back in powerful positions in addition to their advisor roles in the Thai junta.

Furthermore, a lot more familiar faces are on the list as nearly the entire military junta aka the NCPO, including its advisory board, forms the cabinet (with the notable exceptions of junta advisors ACM Itthaporn Subhawong and Somkid Jatusripak), since the junta is going to stay on alongside to the interim government with wide-raging powers guaranteed by its own constitution.

3. Retirement plans for life after the military

As mentioned above, the annual reshuffle of military officers is set to take place this month and five key personnel have reached the age of  60 years and thus mandatory retirement: army chief Gen. Prayuth (PM), supreme commander Gen. Tanasak (Foreign Affairs and dep.-PM), air force chief ACM Prajin (Transport), navy chief Adm. Narong (Education) and Pol.-Gen. Adul Saengsingkaew (Social Development). Whether or not they are actually going to retire from their military ranks and find new 'employment' in the junta and the cabinet is unknown at this point.

4. The Foreign Ministry has some explaining to do

The Nation reported on August 20 that several officials at the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) would find their work "difficult to explain to their foreign counterparts and the international community" if a military officer takes up that portfolio, since they "have plenty of capable diplomats," for the example the new deputy foreign minister Don Pramudwinai, who previously was Thai envoy to the UN.  Now that supreme commander Gen. Tanasak is going to represent the Thai junta to the world, the diplomats will have their work cut out, since "two military coups in a decade is already hard enough to explain," according to a MFA source quoted in The Nation.

5. Operation: education

As the sole cabinet portfolio, the Education Ministry has been assigned two deputy ministers to support Education Minister Adm. Narong Pipatanasai. That's not a big surprise considering Gen. Prayuth's much-touted "reform" plans for Thailand's poor education system involve a 19.3 per cent cut of the total 2015 budget (498.16bn Baht or $15.66bn, to be precise), but also a big emphasis on "Thai values and morals" rather than an overhaul of the curriculum for the promotion of critical thinking and analysis. It also doesn't help that an apparent follower of pseudoscience and a paranormal cult has been put in charge of reforming the public school curriculum.

6. The many more hats of Gen. Prayuth

Last week before his nomination and eventual confirmation as prime minister, we talked about the "many hats" Gen. Prayuth is already wearing as army chief and junta leader. In fact, we forgot to mention that ever since the military coup he's now wearing a total of 15 different hats, meaning he's the chairman or president of several government committees, TV channels and even sport clubs. There's also news that he's even going to take over command of the 4th army region, which Thailand's troubled South. With his mandatory retirement as army chief anything but certain, it begs the question if he will be able to juggle everything?

7. Other observations

Continuing the trend of severe gender imbalance set by the NLA, there are only two women in the cabinet: Deputy Commerce Minister Apiradi Tantraporn and Tourism Minister Kobkarn Wattanavrangkul. The latter is also currently - quite puzzingly - CEO of Toshiba Thailand, but no apparent conflict of interest has been signalled here yet, despite two members stepping down from their board positions at Post Publishing (see above).

Two new cabinet members were also cabinet members in the last junta government 2006-07: Mr Pridiyathorn Devakula (then Finance, now dep.-PM) and Yongyuth Yutthawon (then Science, now dep.-PM)

And finally, the average of the "Prayuth 1" cabinet members is 62.4 years old. As of now, the abilities and knowledge of the new ministers who'll lead the ministries' policies are yet to be proven.

The Thai junta's 2015 draft budget, explained in 4 graphs

Originally published at Siam Voices on August 19, 2014 Thailand's National Legislative Assembly (NLA) approved the draft for the 2015 budget in its first reading on Monday. The body, whose members were all picked by the military junta and is thus dominated by active and retired military officers, rubber-stamped the budget bill with 183 votes and three abstentions (assumed to be the assembly president and his two deputies). Noting the lack of votes against the bill, junta leader and army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha quipped: "Nobody had any problems. Nobody disagreed."

An ad-hoc committee will screen the budget bill and it is expected to be completed by September 1 and put to a vote on September 17, all well before the start of the new fiscal year on October 1. By then a new cabinet is expected to be in charge of the interim government.

The proposed 2015 budget sees a total allocation of 2.58 trillion baht (US$81.08bn) - 50bn Baht ($1.57bn) or roughly 2 per cent more than the previous budget. According to the Budget Bureau's published draft (translated spreadsheet) from last month it breaks down like this:

Not only are ministries listed, but also civil servants, the bureaucratic system, provincial funds, the so-called "independent" government agencies (e.g. the obstructionist Election Commission) and many others.

As is evident above, education set to get a big chunk out of that pie chart with 498.16bn Baht ($15.66bn) being allocated to the Education Ministry, but more on that later.

But not only the Education Ministry can look forward to an increased budget as the next graph shows:

The increased budgets for the ministries of transport, interior and agriculture are not surprising.

On the transportation front, the junta has recently approved 741.46bn Baht ($23.3bn) for the construction of two high speed train routes from Thailand's industry belt on the eastern coast up to the north and north-east to Chiang Rai and Nong Khai respectively. The main goal seems to be to improve freight links with China, as evidenced by the fact that neither or fthe routes will pass through the capital Bangkok.

The Interior Ministry is also in charge of many administrative issues down to the local level  (e.g. appointed provincial governors). Whether that money will be used for any decentralization efforts has yet to be seen, even though that looks very unlikely at the moment.

And with the military junta pledging to help rice farmers get the money that the toppled (elected) government's rice subsidy scheme couldn't pay out, the rise of the Agriculture Ministry's budget is unsurprising. On the other end of the spectrum, the massive cut for the Finance Ministry could also be related to the rice scheme and thus a punishment of sorts by the military junta.

The loss of almost a third of the Tourism Ministry's budget appears to be counterintuitive, as tourist arrivals are currently down 10 per cent compared to this time last year - unsurprising, given the prolonged political crisis and its (politically) violent resolution.

The next two graphs are by ThaiPublica and focus on a trend of government spending in the past decade, regardless of who is in power. Let's start off with the education spending between 2008 until today:

As regular readers of this blog know, Thailand's education system leaves muchto be desired and is a serious concern not only when it comes to regional competitiveness, but also - in the opinion of this author and others - one of the root causes of why Thailand has a prolonged political crisis in the first place.

Previous governments in Thailand were already spending a sizable amount of its national budget for education, but ultimately more money was thrown at the problem rather than a complete and long overdue overhaul of the curriculum.

Noteworthy is the repeated emphasis by junta leader and army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha to re-examine and thoroughly reform Thailand's education system. The 498.16bn baht ($15.66 billion) are more likely to be spent to teach Thai children about the "Thai values and morals" that Gen Prayuth has been preaching and to re-enforce the archaic, militaristic attitude at Thai schools, rather than critical thinking and individuality on the part of the students.

The last graph is on military spending in the past 10 years and the trend should be quite obvious:

After the military coup of 2006 (or 2549 in the Buddhist calendar) the defense budget rose annually between 25 to 33 per cent until 2010, before levelling off in 2011-2012.

However, in a bid by Yingluck's government to appease the military, the defense budget increased again gradually - we all know by now how well this worked out for her and her government...

Thus, it comes to no surprise that military spending has grown over 100bn Baht ($3.14bn) or 135 per cent over the last 10 years and with next year's budget draft, the junta is adding another 5 per cent, or 193.07bn baht (US$6.07bn).

While these graphs are a good indicator about where Thailand's military junta is putting its emphasis, what they cannot directly visualize is the character of the junta and its leader Gen Prayuth, who said that if Thailand doesn't "purchase new weapons, then nobody will fear us".

Prayuth also stressed that the junta only has "limited time" to govern before an eventual promised return of civilian power sometime later next year, but as stated in the interim constitution, Gen Prayuth and the junta will be calling the shots until then - and most likely beyond that, including complete control over the country's finances and an assembly to rubber stamp it.

Infographic: Thailand's junta-appointed National Legislative Assembly

Originally published at Siam Voices on August 1, 2014 On Thursday evening, Thailand's King Bhumibol Adulyadej officially endorsed the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), whose 200 members are all appointed by the military junta. A clear majority is dominated by active and retired military officers, while the rest consists of businesspeople, academics, technocrats and former senators. Former politicians of recent governments are barred from eligibility as stated in the recently established interim constitution.

This is another step by the so-called "National Council for Peace and Order" (NCPO), as the junta formally calls itself, in its self-proclaimed "reform process" since the military coup of May 22, 2014, with the promise of new elections sometime in late 2015.

After the establishment of the interim constitution last week and the endorsement of the NLA members, the legislature will convene for the first time on August 7 and nominate a prime minister, who will then be tasked to appoint members to his Cabinet. It seems almost certain that army chief and junta leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha will become interim prime minister and many members of the NCPO his cabinet ministers. The NCPO will remain in place and will still have ultimate power over the post-coup government.

(NOTE: If you spot any mistakes, please let me know on Twitter @Saksith. This infographic will likely be reviewed and updated accordingly.)

A first look at Thailand's new interim constitution

Originally published at Siam Voices on July 23, 2014

Two months after Thailand's military has staged a coup on May 22, 2014, the country has now adopted a new interim constitution. Army chief and junta leader General Prayuth Chan-Ocha was granted an audience with King Bhumibol Adulyadej on Tuesday in order to seek His Majesty's endorsement of the country's 19th constitution.

The 2014 Interim Constitution, available online HERE on the website of the Royal Gazette, is 17 pages long, consists of 48 articles and draws up how and who will govern Thailand, who will draft and approve the next full constitution, and what role the military junta aka the "National Council for Peace and Order" (NCPO) will still have - all that with the proclaimed aim of creating a "genuine democracy" by "reforming" the country and "eradicating corruption" as stated in the constitution's preamble, before organizing new elections sometime by October 2015.

Here's a first look and analysis of some of the key aspects of the new interim constitution, grouped by field of topics. (Note: All citations are unofficial, rough translations by this author.)

The National Legislative Assembly (สภานิติบัญญัตแห่งชาต)

Article 6: The National Legislative Assembly should have no more than 220 members, who should be of Thai nationality since birth and no younger than 40 years of age and appointed by the NCPO. The National Legislative Assembly will assume the duties of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Article 7: Members of the National Legislative Assembly should be knowledgeable and come from different groups in society such as the state sector, the private sector, the social sector, the academic sector, the professional sector and other sectors that are beneficial to the National Legislative Assembly.

Article 8: A member of the National Legislative Assembly is prohibited from assuming office if he/she:

1. Has assumed a position in a political party within three years prior to the date of appointment as member of the National Legislative Assembly.
2. Is a Buddhist novice or priest.
3. Is bankrupt or has caused bankruptcy through corruption.
4. Has been previously stripped of his/her right to vote.
5. Has been previously expelled, dismissed or fired as a government official or employee at a state enterprise on the grounds of corruption, fraud or misconduct.
6. Has had assets seized by the court.
7. Has been previously barred or removed from political office. (...)

The National Legislative Assembly (NLA) will be housing both chambers of the House filled with appointees of the junta, who are not politicians or have been that for the past three years (perhaps coincidentally, three years since the election victory of the government the junta has just ousted), but instead with representatives from different sectors of society. Sounds familiar...

The Prime Minister and the cabinet (นายกรัฐมนตรและคณะรัฐมนตรี)

Article 19: HM The King endorses the Prime Minister and other ministers, not exceeding 35 [cabinet members], who are is appointed by the National Legislative Assembly and not more than 35 ministers recommended by the Prime Minister to constitute the Cabinet (...)

[NOTE, July 24: The article above has been corrected to better reflect the appointment process. Apologies for any confusion.]

The requirements of a prime minister or cabinet member stay mostly the same (Article 20) compared to the previous constitution: still must be born Thai, now has to be no younger than 40 years (previously 35), still has to be university education with at least a Bacherlor's degree. However, like the members of the NLA, the prime minister and the other ministers must not have assumed a position in a political party within the last three years.

Also, he/she cannot be at the same time be a member of the NLA, the National Reform Council, the Constitutional Drafting Committee, the member of a local government or of the independent government agencies (e.g. Election Commission, National Anti-Corruption Commission, National Human Rights Commission etc.). That would already exclude a lot of potential candidates and make way for plenty others.

The cabinet may be allowed to attend and speak at the NLA, but they are not allowed to cast their vote at the sessions (Article 19).

The National Reform Council (สภาปฏิรูปแห่งชาติ)

Article 27: A National Reform Council should study and propose reforms to the following areas:

(1) Politics, (2) Public administration, (3) Law and Justice, (4) Local government, (5) Education, (6) Economy, (7) Energy resources, (8) Public health & environment, (9) Mass Media, (10) Social, (11) others

This will allow a democratic regime with the King as the Head of State that is in accordance with a Thai society in which elections are honest and fair, with mechanisms to prevent and eradicate corruption and misconduct, to eliminate disparity and create social and economic fairness, in order to have sustainable development.

Article 28: The National Reform Council should have not more than 250 members. (…)

As with members of the NLA, the members of the National Reform Council (NRC) are appointed by the junta and are subject to the same restrictions as stated in Article 8. The composition of the NRC is a little bit more complex:

Article 30: The NCPO will appoint members of the National Reform Council based on the following rules:

1. Establish a selection committee which will appoint members for the committees of each area as stated in Article 27 and also a selection committee in every province (…)
2. The NCPO will appoint the selection committees from a line of experts (…)
3. The selection committee is tasked to find qualified persons based on Article 28 and Article 29 (…). A list with names will be submitted to the NCPO for approval. Members of the selection committee cannot put their own names on the list
4. The selection as stated in (3) should consider a diverse range of candidates from various sectors such as from the state, private, social, academia, professional and other sectors that are beneficial to the work of the National Reform Council, including from all provinces (…) all genders and those less privileged.

Going by that text, the makeup of the the NRC would be 77 members - one from each province - and 173 others, who are able to send draft bills to the National Legislative Assembly for consideration (Article 31.3). Also, how inclusive will be the council really be? For example, will "all genders" be represented, including transgender people?

The Constitutional Drafting Committee (คณะกรรมาธิการยกร่างรัฐธรรมนูญ)

Article 32: A Constitutional Drafting Committee should prepare a draft constitution, which consists of 36 members (...)

1. The chairman will be appointed by the NCPO
2. The National Reform Council will appoint 20 members
3. The National Legislative Assembly, the Cabinet and the NCPO will appoint 5 members each

As the name implies, the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) is tasked to draft a new full constitution in 120 days after its inception through the National Reform Council (NRC) (Article 34) and will include a broad catalogue of considerations (Article 35, which we may cover in a future post) such as mechanisms to "eradicate corruption".

However, should the CDC fail to present a finished draft at the end of the 120 days, the committee will be sacked and a new one will be set up (Article 38). Even more severe, should the draft be rejected by the National Reform Council or should the consideration take longer than 15 days (as stated in Article 37), BOTH the Constitutional Drafting Committee and the National Reform Council will be dissolved and replaced by a new one, and the whole process starts anew (also Article 38). All sacked members would be barred from joining the newly formed CDC and NRC. There could be a potentially interesting precedent here.

Also, as expected, there's no word on a public referendum on the new constitution.

The National Council for Peace and Order (คณะรักษาความสงบแห่งชาติ)

It comes at no surprise that the NCPO, aka the junta, will maintain some considerable influence for the foreseeable future. It affirms that the junta is in charge in the absence of a government and parliament (Article 43) and all past 100+ orders and announcements are still valid (Article 47). And Article 44 underlines that the junta will stay in power:

Article 44: For the benefit of the reform process to promote unity and solidarity of the people or in order to prevent or protect from threats against public order, national security, the monarchy, national economy or sovereignty of the country - no matter whether it’s from inside or outside the country - the head of the NCPO is authorized, with the approval of the NCPO board, to order, to suspend or to take action, regardless of its effects on the legislative, executive or judiciary. All orders or acts are to be regarded as lawful and constitutional. At the conclusion of that order or act, the speaker of the National Legislative Assembly and the Prime Minister are to be notified as soon as possible.

What may appear as an emergency passage for some, this is basically a carte blanche authorizing the junta to do nearly everything it sees fit, from calling special meetings to seemingly unlimited vetoing powers. No matter if it violates this constitution or law, this article could enable extrajudicial actions against those it sees as a threat.

And finally, the very last article of the interim constitution states:

Article 48: All acts related to the seizure of power on May 22, 2014 by the NCPO and those associated or ordered by the head [of NCPO] (…) regardless of its impact on the legislature, executive and judiciary (…) and regardless of the acts carried out on, before or after said day, should those acts are considered to be unlawful, all those associated with those acts are entirely free of fault or guilt.

As with previous coups, the junta has written its own amnesty into law.

Summary aka the "tl;dr"-part

• A fully junta-appointed, 220-strong National Legislative Assembly that doubles as both the parliament and the senate, which will deliberate and vote on bills.
• A 250-strong National Reform Council supposedly representing a broad section of society and all provinces looking to reform almost every aspect in the country and also able to draft bills.
• All persons holding a position at a political party within the past three years are barred from participating.
• A 36-strong Constitutional Drafting Committee tasked with, well, drafting a new constitution with 120 days or else faced with dissolution, only to be replaced by a new committee. No word of a public referendum.
• The NCPO aka the junta will still wield considerable powers whenever it sees fit and also has given itself an amnesty for the May 22 coup.
• According to media reports, all appointments should be done by September later this year and more official details are expected Wednesday morning at a press conference by the NCPO.

The Thai post-coup government: The junta's shadowy cabinet

Originally published at Siam Voices on July 7, 2014 This is part two in a three-part series looking at how the Thai junta government after the military coup will be structured, governed and by whom this will be led. Part one details the mass purge among government officials. Today we look who could be in the interim cabinet.

Since the military coup of May 22, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) spent its first weeks seizing and establishing full control over the branches of government power. The sole executive and legislative powers at the moment lie in the hands of the generals and their advisors. The notable exception is the judiciary (i.e. Constitutional Court) and the supposedly "independent" government agencies like the Election Commission and National Anti-Corruption Commission, which all played a role in at least exacerbating Thailand's political deadlock that ended with the coup d'etat.

But the junta is now quickly moving ahead to work on the implementation of the next interim constitution, the government (both of which we will be discussing in a future article in the series), and with it the next cabinet. As repeatedly stated by the junta and its leader, army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha, all these should be coming around very soon, "at the latest in September," as Prayuth said in one of the weekly televised NCPO announcements. 

While no official announcements have been made about the make-up of the future cabinet, it didn’t stop Thai media from speculating who is likely to be appointed as a minister in the next Thai government, as Matichon Weekly magazine and the Thai Rath daily newspaper did last month.

This is what Matichon predicts the administration of "Prayuth 1" could look like:

• Prime Minister: Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha
• Deputy-PM (Security): Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan
• Deputy-PM (Economy): Pridiyathorn Devakula
• Deputy-PM (Commerce) Somkid Jatusripitak
• Deputy-PM (Law): Visanu Krue-ngam
• Foreign Minister: Surakiat Sathirathai
• Defense Minister: Gen. Anupong Paochinda
• Interior Minister: Gen. Daopong Rattanasuwan
• Transport Minister: Air Chief Marshall Prajin Jantong
• ICT Minister: Gen. Thanasak Pratimapagorn
• Energy Minister: Piyasvasti Amranand or Prasert Boonsampan
• Justice Minister: Borownsak Uwanno
• Finance Minister: Prasarn Trairatvorakul

- Source: "คอลัมน์: ลึกแต่ไม่ลับ", Matichon Weekly, Vol. 34, Issue 1766, June 20, 2014

Thai Rath’s cabinet prediction is the same concerning the Defense, Interior and Transport portfolio, with the latter two ministers also potentially becoming deputy-PMs. It also sees Police-General Adul Saengsing-Kaew and Navy commander-in-chief Admiral Narong Pipthanasai being appointed deputy prime ministers as well as Assistant Army Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant-General Paibul Kumchaya and deputy army chief Gen. Udomdej Sitabutr getting cabinet positions.

Both lists include numerous familiar names from the military and former administrations, not least because almost all of them are working in the current junta administration (see our infographic here), either overseeing the ministries they may or may not be heading in the near future, or serving on the advisory board to the junta. Case in point: its chief advisors, former defense minister Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan and former army chief Gen. Anupong Paochinda. Both men have reportedly supported the prolonged anti-government protests of the ousted prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra.

Among the non-military members of the speculated interim cabinet are Surakiat Sathirathai (Foreign) and Somkid Jatusripitak (Commerce) - both former ministers under Thaksin Shinawatra a decade ago - current Bank of Thailand governor Prasarn Trairatvorakul (Finance), Prasert Boonsampan (former CEO of the state-owned oil and gas company PTT) and Piyasvasti Amranand (former Thai Airways CEO and recently appointed PTT chairman), both tipped to become the next energy minister under the junta. 

Somkid is particularly interesting since during the Thaksin years, he was credited for the economic and social (often called populist) policies that won over the rural population and ensured a solid large voter base for the following elections. That seemingly clashes with the persistent anti-populism stance of anti-Thaksin groups including the military junta, so much so that the junta wants to have populism outlawed in the next charter. However, unlike his fellow cabinet and party members he was not arrested after the last military coup of 2006 and he has apparently broken his ties with Thaksin, which partially explains why he’s now one of the advisors to the junta.

But the biggest question that also has the largest consensus among political observers is the position of the prime minister, which will be most likely filled by none other than army chief and junta leader Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha himself.

Gen Prayuth could remain as NCPO chief so he could continue to supervise the new government to be set up in early September. The difference is whether he would retire as army chief or extend his term while serving as NCPO chief.

The other scenario is that Gen Prayuth could become prime minister himself in line with the NCPO's increasing popularity. He could then appoint new heads of the armed forces so the rank and file could be promoted.

-"Prayuth at a crossroads as retirement nears", Bangkok Post, June 21, 2014

Gen. Prayuth is scheduled to retire as army chief on September 30 during the annual reshuffle of military officers. Same goes for Gen. Thanasak Patimapakorn, Adm. Narong Pipattanasai and ACM Prajin Juntong, the commander-in-chief of the supreme command, the navy and the air force respectively.

Not only would the timing fit here, since Prayuth could be at the helm of the interim government beginning in September when the aforementioned military reshuffling takes place or a new budget is seeking approval. But it also is in line with the general impression that Thailand’s junta, with the new interim cabinet, constitution and parliamentary bodies, is making sure to put down the new roots in order to wield considerable influence for the next government(s) to come.

However, the rumored self-appointment would also unwittingly turn General Prayuth into something he would deny wanting to become: a politician.

Burma, Cambodia 'hail' Thai junta: With neighbors like these...

Originally published at Siam Voices on July 5, 2014

For the Thai military, launching a coup in Thailand is one thing, but maintaining it is a whole other task. Probably one of the hardest jobs for the junta is to seek universal legitimacy from the international community - especially since "the transition of power" was very one-sided, to say the least.

So it comes as no surprise that the international reactions to the coup of May 22, especially from the Western world ranged from concern to condemnation (e.g. from the US and Australia) and sanctions against Thailand (from the EU), while China seized the opportunity for increased engagement with the military junta - which also explains why a group of Chinese businessmen were among the first to meet army chief and junta leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha shortly after the coup.

Despite the backlash from the West, the junta claims* some positive acknowledgment from Vietnam, and it appears that other neighboring countries are equally amicable toward the Thai generals - resulting in some utterly bizarre statements:

Thailand’s military on Friday compared its seizure of power in May to restore stability after months of unrest to the brutal crackdown by Burma’s former junta in 1988 to snuff out a pro-democracy movement.

Thailand’s military justified its intervention by the need to restore stability after months of unrest and demonstrations by pro and anti-government protesters.

Perhaps unwittingly, the deputy chief of the Thai junta likened its seizure of power to one of the darkest chapters in the rule of Burma’s junta, its crushing of pro-democracy protests in 1988 when at least 3,000 people were killed. 

“[Burma's] government agrees with what Thailand is doing in order to return stability to the nation. [Burma] had a similar experience to us in 1988, so they understand,” said Tanasak Patimapragorn, supreme commander of Thailand’s armed forces, following a visit to Bangkok by Burma’s army chief General Min Aung Hlaing. (...)

The visit by Burma’s military commander, General Min Aung Hlaing, marks the second by a foreign official since the coup, after that of Malaysia’s defense minister.

-"Thai Junta Compares its Coup to Burma’s 1988 Crackdown", Reuters, July 4, 2014

In a separate meeting with junta chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha, Min Aung Hlaing voiced his support for the NCPO solving Thailand's problems. [Burma] understood the situation, said spokesman Colonel Werachon Sukhondhapatipak*.

-"Junta did right thing: Myanmar chief", The Nation, July 5, 2014

*(Side note: Almost all news where foreign envoys supposedly express their "understanding for the political situation in Thailand" are almost exclusively made by a Thai junta spokesman or member - so it's to be taken with a grain of salt.)

A lot can be said about the apparent history-related blind spot not only on the Burmese army's part, but also its Thai counterpart (and we already had a few examples of selective historic knowledge by Thai politicians in the past).

Reuters South East Asia Correspondent Andrew Marshall sums it up best:

That a top general from Burma has "hailed" Thailand's military junta should alarm people in both countries: http://t.co/vgCcXRGzZ5

— Andrew RC Marshall (@Journotopia) July 4, 2014

In related news, there's also some praise coming from the other side of the Thai border:

In a bid to reinforce the legitimacy of his government amid an ongoing parliamentary boycott by the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party, Prime Minister Hun Sen yesterday looked west for an analogy.

He chose one that didn’t involve a ballot box.

Instead, he pointed to Thailand’s National Council for Peace and Order, which was formed after the military’s May coup and immediately began clamping down on dissenting voices, as a suitable parallel.

Both governments had received royal approval, Hun Sen said, and were therefore equally legitimate.

-"Gov’t as legit as junta: premier", Phnom Penh Post, July 4, 2014

Hun Sen's evident approval comes after he criticized the Thai junta for its handling of Cambodian migrant workers amidst a sudden mass-exodus in which an estimated 250,000 Cambodians have returned from Thailand, many out of panic after the junta announced a crackdown on illegal migrant workers and rumors of abuse in police custody.

However, this also follows the release of Veera Somkwamkid, a Thai ultra-nationalist activist who was arrested and jailed in 2011 after illegally crossing the border in late 2010 to claim that a disputed border region belongs to Thailand. Upon Veera's return, 14 Cambodians have been released from Thai custody, but Thai officials have stopped short of stating that this was a prisoner swap.

On one hand, the Thai military states that it is "unfazed" by outside reactions (especially from the West), yet at the same time it seemingly gladly accepts legitimizing praise from other, not-so-democratic countries.

With neighboring rulers like these...!

The Thai post-coup government: Purging bureaucrats

Originally published at Siam Voices on July 3, 2014 This is part one in a three-part series looking at how the Thai junta government after the military coup will be structured, governed and by whom this will be led. Today's article details the mass purge among government officials. 

"I would like to thank the NCPO for giving me this opportunity,” says the woman who just got her job back from the Thai military junta. "I am a bureaucrat. I am ready to work to my best ability.”

That woman isn’t just some bureaucrat. Dr. Pornthip Rojanasunand is a well-known public figure in Thailand thanks to her work as a forensic scientist and was formerly hailed as a proponent for scientific evidence in criminal investigations, thanks to a couple of high-profile cases in the 1990s and her constant rows with the police. In 2005, she became head of the Central Institute of Forensic Science (CIFS), which is attached to the Ministry of Justice.

Having said that, her fame turned into infamy in the last couple of years when she publicly defended the notorious and fraudulent bomb-detecting device GT200 repeatedly, despite proven evidence that the device is less reliable and accurate than a coin toss and a teardown revealed it to be nothing more than an empty plastic shell with an attached dowsing rod. Furthermore, the UK-based distributor of the GT200 was found guilty by a local court and sentenced to 10 years in jail.

The Thai army has procured about 1,000 of these bogus bomb-sniffers, costing somewhere between 700m – 800m Baht ($221m – $252m), while the real cost for it has been hardly 1000 Baht ($30) a piece. Several government agencies were reported to also have utilized in the GT200, including Pornthip’s CIFS.

It’s rumored Pornthip was removed as CIFS head because of the GT200  and was made inspector-general. Now the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), as the military junta is formally called, has ordered to reverse this decision, putting Dr. Pornthip back in charge. She already has ideas to revamp Thailand's forensic institutions.

But she is arguably only  the most prominent among dozens of government officials either promoted, transferred or sacked, as the military junta is shaking up the ranks after it seized power in a military coup in May, toppling the government of prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra.

As many as 18 top government personnel have been re-appointed to advisor roles at various ministries, including the currently vacated Prime Minister’s Office - a universal euphemism among political insiders for an inactive post that will be terminated after the eventual retirement of an official.

General Nipat Thonglek, who had pledged full allegiance to ousted prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, has been removed from the Defence Ministry permanent secretary post and is now chief adviser to the Defence Ministry. He has been replaced by General Surasak Kanjanarat.

Also gone is Tarit Pengdith, the former director-general of the Department of Special Investigation who pledged his allegiance to Yingluck and vowed to take legal action against those responsible for the political crackdown in 2010 under the Abhisit Vejjajiva government.

-"Many top officials shown the door", The Nation, June 29, 2014

The shunting of Srirat Rastapana from permanent commerce secretary to an adviser at the PM's Office, is believed to stem from her close ties to Thaksin.

(…) she travelled to Dubai and Hong Kong to meet Thaksin. However, (…) Ms Srirat is known to be efficient and has a clean image. (…)

Meanwhile, the transfers of Customs Department chief Rakop Srisupaat and Revenue Department chief Sutthichai Sangkhamanee are not a big surprise as both are thought to have close relationships with the Shinawatra family. (…)

Mr Rakop is believed to have a close relationship with Ms Yaowapa and he was a classmate of Phorruethai, the wife of Thaksin's younger brother Phayap, at the National Defence College.

-"Regime kicks off second major purge", Bangkok Post, July 2, 2014

The case of former DSI director-general is particularly interesting since he has famously switched allegiances from the administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva to the government of Yingluck Shinawatra after their election victory in 2011. Just a year before that, Tharit was publicly hunting leaders of the red shirts movement and under his leadership the investigation of at least 90 killed persons during the red shirt protests in 2010 were slow at best, even suggesting that the red shirts killed each other.

However, under the Yingluck administration, Tharit was going after the men he previously served, charging Abhisit and former deputy-prime minister Suthep Thuagsuban (who would, as we all know, later become the anti-government protest leader and according to himself an accomplice in the long-planned coup) with murder for their involvement in the 2010 red shirt crackdown, while just stopping short from charging military officers following an angry uproar by the army chief and current junta leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha.

As for Dr. Pornthip, her political leanings were never really a secret: she appeared several times in the past on stages of rallies against the governments associated with toppled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, as recently as the anti-government protests of Suthep Thuagsuban this year.

Dr. Pornthip’s return and the mass-transfers of government officials signal the military junta’s downright purge of officials associated to the toppled government of Yingluck and her brother Thaksin, and partially replace them with officials sympathetic to the anti-Thaksin faction.

Just as a comparison: During the Yingluck government, there was much outcry over the transfer of only one person (National Security Council secretary Thawil Pliensri in 2011), so much so that the Constitutional Court chased her out of office in a prelude to the coup.

In post-coup Thailand, junta mandates ‘happiness’ and ‘reconciliation’

Originally published at Siam Voices on June 10, 2014 [Author's note: Due to the military coup of May 22, 2014 and subsequent censorship measures we have placed certain restrictions on what we publish. Please also read Bangkok Pundit's post on that subject. We hope to return to full and free reporting and commentary in the near future.]

#495528681 / gettyimages.com

To bring back love, how long will it take? Please, will you wait? We will move beyond disputes We will do what we promised. We are asking for a little more time.

These words accompanied by the soft melody of synthesized strings could be mistaken for the lines of any other contemporary Thai pop ballad. However, going back a few seconds shows that this song tackles an entirely different theme with a certain schmalz:

Today the nation is facing menacing danger The flames are rising Let us be the ones who step in, before it is too late

The lyrics belong to the song ”Returning Happiness to Thailand” (in Thai: ”คืนความสุขให้ประเทศไทย”) and is claimed to be written by army chief and junta leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha himself in just ”one hour”, but it’s still ”a message from his heart,” according to local media reports.

The song is just one part the military's campaign to win back the hearts and minds of the Thai people after it launched a coup d’ètat on May 22, seizing absolute power, largely censoring media, detaining hundreds of people - many of them members of the toppled government, their supporters and outspoken academics and journalists - and generally cracking down on any criticism of the coup.

National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), as the junta calls itself, launched its reconciliation efforts last week in Bangkok with a street fair:

At a junta-sponsored event on Wednesday in Bangkok — part concert, part street fair — an army truck operating as a mobile kitchen dished out thousands of free "Happy Omelets and Rice." Doctors from a military hospital gave out free medicine and checked blood pressure. A line of soldiers with shields and face paint stood ready for crowds to snap selfies.

The event drew mostly residents who supported the takeover, and it took place at a roundabout where just a few days earlier soldiers in riot gear had faced off against hundreds of anti-junta protesters. (…)

”Cheer up, Thailand! Junta aims to return happiness”, Associated Press, June 7, 2014

If the first two weeks since the power seizure were about ‘shock and awe’ (especially in the provinces whose population supported and elected the toppled government), the efforts since then are focusing on what the junta sees as the most pressing issues, but doing so with a benevolent appearance.

Apart from the street fairs, the junta is also paying back rice farmers what they are owed from the Yingluck Shinawatra government's ill-fated rice pledging scheme, and other populist measures like fixing fuel prices and protection from loan sharks. Furthermore, it is currently reviewing the big-investment projects of the previous, looking what it can salvage as its own policy.

Another main point of the junta’s efforts are the so-called ”reconciliation centers” that are being set up across the country. The general concept of these ”reconciliation centers” are to create a space where people and groups with opposite political viewpoints (think red shirts vs yellow shirts) are brought together to the table with the military acting as the self-appointed mediator.

The organization tasked to oversee these centers is the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC), a body that has been around for a few decades, as David Streckfuss explains:

The military's Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), set up 50 years ago to ostensibly root out communists, has now been charged with helping parties separated by the political divide to "dissolve their differences” at “reform centers."

”Thailand's Military Is Forcing People to Stop Worrying and Love the Coup”, by David Streckfuss, VICE NEWS, June 3, 2014

It’s not only ISOC’s involvement that makes critics skeptical of these centers, but also its links with history:

"I think the army tried to apply the techniques and concepts from the Cold War era during which they fought with the Communist Party of Thailand,” said Kan Yuenyong of the Siam Intelligence Unit.

“They apply concepts like the Karunyathep Centre which is like a re-education centre, and then after the program they can get back to the society as normal people."

Karunyathep centre was set up in the 1970s, as part of the military's soft approach towards Communist party members. Captured communists would be sent to the re-education camps to be taught about democratic values before being released.

However, the military maintains that the reconciliation centers will operate in today's context and that this time, participation will be voluntary. "The concept might be quite similar but the implementation is different, we understand the context of the current situation,” said Colonel Weerachon.

”Speculation, unease over Thai reconciliation centres”, by Arglit Boonyai, Channel NewsAsia, June 5, 2014

Whether or not these centers will bring reconciliation remains to be seen. A recent 'peace ceremony' in Nakhon Ratchasima is nevertheless being hailed as an "unprecedented" success.

With the military junta slowly taking shape and setting its goals, much depends on how heavy-handed its actions will be against those that do not support the coup. Especially in the age of social media, the traditional methods of the junta to sooth the dissent are becoming less effective and prolonged restrictions on free expression and political gatherings could further de-legitimize the military rule.

To put it in the words of aforementioned song by the junta: "What danger is the nation really facing?"

Infographic: Thailand's New Junta

Originally published at Siam Voices on June 5, 2014

Thailand's media under martial law: Controlling the narrative

Originally published at Siam Voices on May 22, 2014 Martial law gives the Thai military wide-reaching powers, including controlling the media. After its declaration early Tuesday morning  a lot of the focus has been on the press and what they are or aren't allowed to say. But has it been really effective and does it still make sense in the age of social media?

They turned up in the middle of the night. Olive-green trucks and humvees popped up on the parking lots and soldiers entered the buildings of Thailand's various free-TV stations shortly after the Kingdom's military has declared martial law on Tuesday at 3am.

04.46 เนชั่นทีวี บางนา #nationtv pic.twitter.com/QtINse49yt

— เอม นภพัฒน์จักษ์ (@noppatjak) May 19, 2014

All free-to-air (FTA) TV stations (the privately-owned Channel 3, the public ThaiPBS, the partly state-owned MCOT, the fully state-owned NBT and the army-owned Channel 5 and 7) were ordered to comply with the military by broadcasting its announcements on demand. Initially it seemed little had changed.  normal programming continued, only a ticker on army-owned Channel 5 informed viewers of the declaration martial law.

It would take hours before army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha would appear on all television channels at 6.30am to explain his move - "groups with ill-will are creating a violent situation" - and say that he "intends to bring peace to the beloved country of all Thais as soon as possible". He insisted that "this is not a coup d'état" and urged people "to carry with their daily activities as usual."

However, for many Thai journalists the situation was everything but usual. Not only did the martial law put Thailand in a different legal and political situation with far-reaching consequences that would have to be explained to the public, but the media itself was specifically targeted right off the bat with the very first order by the military, also broadcasted on all free-TV channels:

Order No 1 is regarding the broadcast of community radio stations, television broadcasters (satellite and cable), and radio stations and orders them to suspend broadcasting when they are contacted ( ห้ถ่ายทอด ออกรายการจากสถานีวิทยุโทรทัศน์กองทัพบกเมื่อได้รับการประสาน). This is order that there is broadcast of news to the people that is correct/right ( เพื่อให้การเผยแพร่ข่าวสารไปสู่ประชาชนเป็นไปด้วยความถูกต้อง)

(Taken from Bangkok Pundit's blog post detailing all 12 martial law orders.)

Over the course of the day and with more and more orders being announced, it became clear that one of the main objects of the military is to control the media, evident with Order No. 3:

Order No. 3 prohibits media from presenting news that affects peace-keeping of officials ( ห้ามสื่อเสนอข่าวกระทบการรักษาความสงบเรียบร้อยของเจ้าหน้าที่) states that all media entities including online who have the intention to distort, incite, or create disorder or have messages that will make the people to be suspicious [or] to misunderstand and that affects peace-keeping of officials( ที่มีเจตนาบิดเบือน ปลุกระดมให้สร้างสถานการณ์ความวุ่นวาย แตกแยก หรือมีข้อความที่ทำให้ประชาชนเกิดความหวาดระแวง เข้าใจผิด และส่งผลกระทบต่อมาตรการรักษาความสงบเรียบร้อยของเจ้าหน้าที่). Also prohibits distribution of such media.

The first organizations to fall victim to the martial law were 3,000 community radio stations and also in total 14 satellite TV stations, including the protesters' media outlets such as DNN Asia Update of the red shirts and the anti-government protesters' Blue Sky Channel and ASTV/Manager, and later Voice TV (also owned by Thaksin's son) - all of them were forced to "temporarily" stop broadcasting.

ยุติการออกอากาศตามประกาศฉบับที่ 6 ของกฎอัยการศึก pic.twitter.com/3EMcIOyaSd

— Piyachat Kongthin (@Piyachat_TPBS) May 20, 2014

In the evening, as even more orders were broadcast, the military went even further in their attempts to decide what's right and what's wrong with two specific announcements that are so broad that seem impossible to police:

Order No. 9 prohibits the creating of conflict (...) 1. Prohibits the [a] owner, editors, presenters/anchors of print media and all broadcast media to [b] invite persons or groups who do have government positions now whether civil servants or academics including those in the past who are in the judiciary or justice system as well independent organizations [c] from being interviewed or giving opinion [d] that may increase the conflict, distort, or create confusion in society including that may lead to severe violence

That basically bars every expert, pundit and talking head from saying anything on air that is not the official line of the military. While that order targets a specific amount of people, the previous order is a warning shot against everybody else:

Order No. 8 requests cooperation from the online media community and states that in order to distribute news that is correct/right and without distortion and that causes misunderstanding and the situation to have more conflict to the extent that affects peace-keeping officials in bring happiness back to society quickly that requests for those who are connected with online media to suspend the provision of services that incite and creates violence, and affect the credibility and respect for law until the point it affects peace-keeping officials. If it continues, the KPCC shall suspend the service immediately including taking legal action against those who commit actions.

That is such a vague definition and can be so broadly interpreted that arbitrary prosecutions could result. The military has summoned the representatives of Internet service providers Wednesday afternoon to elaborate on ways to manage social media chatter, even though the blocking of many websites isn't as easy as the military would have liked it, especially if the offending hosting website is based abroad.

On Thursday morning the new body set up to monitor the Internet said it was blocking "six inappropriate websites", insisting that "this is not censorship".

Several commentators and media advocates have criticized the harsh restrictions on the media and freedom of speech, with four Thai national journalist association's asking the military to review the orders in a joint statement. The Bangkok-based Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA) has correctly noted that out of the 12 orders, 5 "directly impact media freedom and freedom of expression."

While the military has somewhat seized control of the airwaves, it isn't entirely controlling the headlines in the print media as many newspapers have been at least skeptical of martial law and many front pages have also mentioned the shutdown of the 14 TV stations. As for social media, the very notion of controlling it through such drastic measures is futile.

Supinya Klangnarong, a member of the National Broadcast & Telecommunication Commission, was quoted in the New York Times that "the martial law does not cover new technology like the Internet. It’s not realistic and practical." That's hardly surprising, since the Martial Law Act the military has invoked is from 1914.

Thai constitutional court ousts Yingluck; Cabinet appoints new PM

Thailand's Constitutional Court has found caretaker prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra guilty in the illegal transfer of National Security Council secretary Thawil Pliensri and has ordered her to step down.

The judges ruled that the transfer is considered "interference" and a "conflict of interest" that is "lacking in ethics and morals".

Thawil Pliensri was transferred from his post of National Security Council secretary in 2011, shortly after the newly-elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra took office (we reported).

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