The Department of Sluggish Investigation's Probe Into Protests' Deaths
Note: This post has been originally published on August 25, 2010 in series of guest blogger posts for Bangkok Pundit at AsianCorrespondent. The Department of Special Investigation (DSI) held a press conference on Monday to inform about the progress of the inquiry of the 91 deaths during the anti-government protests. What they have announced though leaves much to be desired.
The Department of Special Investigation (DSI) says it cannot at this stage reach a finding in its investigation into the deaths of 91 people killed in the violence between April 10 and May 21 during the street protests by the red-shirt United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD).
This was announced at a press conference on Monday by Col Fuangwich Anirutthewa, secretary to the justice minister, and Pol Col Narat Savetnant, deputy director-general of the DSI.
Pol Col Narat said the DSI has so far received 266 cases from police involving the violence between April 10 and May 21.
From its preliminary investigation into the 91 people who died it could be concluded at this stage only that the deaths were unnatural and caused by other persons under Article 148 of the Criminal Procedures Code.
The DSI knew only what caused their death and types of weapons used, but could not yet say who killed them.
"Little progress in red probe", Bangkok Post, August 23, 2010
First of there's the question on how they come up with the figure of 91 deaths during the protests. Looking at the official figures form the Bangkok Emergency Medical Service indicate that according to this list (PDF) published on May 23, 86 people have were killed. But this document show 87 names of the dead with the last victim being dated on May 14, five days before the last day of the protests and of the street battles. It appears that not included are the six people killed inside Wat Pathum, a designated safe zone many protesters fled to after the red shirts dispersed on May 19, but were still shot inside the temple. So how do these numbers all add up to 91?
And then there was this very interesting detail made during the announcement:
Autopsies on 89 Thais, including 11 policemen and soldiers, confirmed that all had died from bullet wounds.
"Investigators fail to identify killers of foreign journalists", Deutsche Presse Agentur via The Nation, August 23
Again a considerably spectacular claim by the authorities, if you think about that various sources claim different causes in various cases such as the death of Col. Romklao Thuwatham during the clashes on April 10, as he was reportedly killed by a bomb. On the other hand though other news sources have reported that the DSI "had received only 42 autopsy results from officials in each jurisdiction," (Source) so it is highly possible that all the 42 autopsies report that they all have died from bullet wounds and the rest might have from other causes as well.
Another focus of the announcement were the deaths of the two foreign reporters, Japanese Reuters cameraman Hiro Muramoto and Italian photographer Fabio Polenghi.
In the deaths of two foreign journalists, Reuters Japanese cameraman Hiro Muramoto, 43, and independent Italian press photographer Fabio Polenghi, 45, Pol Col Narat said investigators could only conclude they were killed by high-velocity bullets. They have not been able to identify their killers.
However, it could not yet conclude who fired the weapons due to lack of witnesses at the scene, and some of their belongings such as mobile phones and digital cameras had disappeared. [...]
He said the DSI had paid special attention to the two cases since they were delicate and could affect Thailand's relations with Japan and Italy.
"Little progress in red probe", Bangkok Post, August 23, 2010
It is delicate indeed, as on the same day the Japanese foreign minister was on a visit to Thailand and also visited the site Muramoto died.
He was shot in the chest during the clashes on April 10, at Khok Wua intersection, not far from the Democracy Monument as the last pictures on his camera filmed the carnage between soldiers and red shirts.
Fabio Polenghi was killed during the final push of the military onto the red shirts protest site at Rajaprasong on May 19. German journalist Thilo Thielke has published his and his colleagues' investigation into the death of the Italian at New Mandala. Key excerpts of this very detailed account include...
On 21 May, two days after the Fabio’s death, the Police Forensic Institute did a forensic examination. The day after, Fabio Polenghi’s body was cremated in a simple and emotional ceremony attended by his younger sister Isabella, his friends, and his colleagues. Three months later, the Department of Special Investigations (DSI) – the “Thai FBI” – which is in charge of the investigation of Fabio’s killing, still refuses to publish the forensic report. “The investigation is not finished yet”, says Colonel Naras Savestanan, the deputy-director general of DSI. He says he cannot answer basic and crucial questions such as those about the kind of bullet which killed Fabio, the angle and distance of shooting and the location of the killer. Other important questions deal with the location of military sharpshooters who killed many demonstrators on that day as well as the location of the mysterious Black shirts – the armed wing of the Red movement. But also here, the questions find no answers. Or only very vague ones. (...)
“It is more likely that the Italian journalist has been hit by fire from advancing soldiers at the ground level, on Rajdamri road. I cannot see clearly why sharp shooters would particularly target him”, says a journalist who was on the military side on Rajdamri on 19 May. The type of bullet which killed Fabio, if it is revealed publicly someday, is not the most crucial element as Black shirts and military personnel have used some similar weapons. The most important elements are the entry point of the bullet, the description of the wound and the shooting angle, which could cast some light about the location of the shooter. Without these data, there will be no certainty on the identity of who killed the Italian journalist.
"Who killed Italian photographer Fabio Polenghi?", by Thilo Thielke, New Mandala, August 17, 2010
There's still much yet to be investigated and there's still much unknown about the circumstances of the victims. But initially the DSI announcement revealed basically nothing new. We already knew that the two foreign journalists were shot, we already knew that nearly all of the victims died unnaturally and we also already knew that the authorities' inquiry into the deaths will be sluggish at best and will have to do much more in order to convince us that, as they said it, "truth will be established" - but will the public also fully know about it once the investigations have concluded?
Thailand Joins The Anti-BlackBerry Ban(d)wagon - Or Does It?
Note: This post has been originally published on August 20, 2010 in series of guest blogger posts for Bangkok Pundit at AsianCorrespondent. The Thai government's ongoing battle over control of the information technology has made headlines yet again in the last few days over the attempts to block access to the whistleblower site WikiLeaks that have spectacularly backfired on Thursday with the people behind the site setting up a dedicated page displaying all Thailand related documents and adding more fuel to the fire by publishing a deliberately provocative open letter to the Thai government.
This considerable brouhaha over WikiLeaks has partly overshadowed another story also involving communication technology and in this case the consideration of control over its contents.
Col. Nathee Suklarath of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has revealed that today's meeting (Aug 18) has raised the issue whether the usage of the BlackBerry telephone devices (BB) comply with Computer Crime Act of 2007, which states that data files have to be stored for 90 days in order to allow authorities to scrutinize. But BB devices are storing their data abroad, which makes Thailand not able to look into it. This has led into an inquiry to Juti Krai-rirk, Minister of Information and Communication Technology (MICT) to determine whether it complies with the Computer Crime Act or not. [...]
"บอร์ด กทช.จุดประเด็นการใช้งาน “บีบี” หวั่นเข้าข่ายผิด กม.กระทำความผิดทางคอมพิวเตอร์", MCOT, August 18, 2010 (translation by me)
This move comes after the manufactures of the popular BlackBerry devices, Canadian Research in Motion (RIM), has come under increasing pressure by various countries to either let authorities have access to the data (some stating security reasons for the demand) or face a suspension of it's email and web browsing services. The data on BlackBerry devices are being encrypted and routed over RIM's serves in Canada. RIM has eventually complied in some cases and agree to install local servers such as in Saudi Arabia.
The NTC has cited the Computer Crime Act of 2007 and it indeed states that:
Section 26. A service provider must store computer traffic data for at least ninety days from the date on which the data is input into a computer system. However, if necessary, a relevant competent official may instruct a service provider to store data for a period of longer than ninety days but not exceeding one year on a special case by case basis or on a temporary basis.
The service provider must keep the necessary information of the service user in order to be able to identify the service user from the beginning of the service provision, and such information must be kept for a further period not exceeding ninety days after the service agreement has been terminated.
The types of service provider to whom the provisions under paragraph one shall apply and the timing of this application shall be established by a Minister and published in the Government Gazette.
A service provider who fails to comply with this Section must be subject to a fine of not more than five hundred thousand baht.
"An unofficial translation of the Computer Crime Act", Prachatai, July 24, 2007
One can say that the NTC has now at least considered to jump on the worldwide bandwagon to pressure RIM. This can be interpreted as a further sign of the government's attempt to control the flow of information under the excuse of national security, which many other countries have cited. On the other hand it is yet another country RIM has now to either appease or could it be the first country the company might afford to lose. Given their most recent statements on its growth potential in the region it is very unlikely though.
On Friday morning Thairath reports under the title "BlackBerry users can be relieved, [usage] does not contradict of Computer Crime Act, [says] MICT", but...
However, offenders can still be tracked. But in cases that require to look into the data that has been communicated through BB that is potentially illegal or not, [the authorities] would then have to ask the firm Research in Motion in Canada for assistance. [Also] the security authorities have to determine whether the security rulings [?] do sufficiently cover or not even though the Computer Crime Act of 2007 cannot enforce services that are based abroad as seen in the case of material offending to the Monarchy being uploaded to YouTube. [click here for background]
"คนใช้ 'บีบี' สบายใจได้ ไอซีทีชี้ไม่ขัดพรบ. คอมฯ", Thairath, August 20, 2010 (translation by me, via Thai Netizen Network)
So, even though the MICT has given some clarity in this case, does it mean it will still nonetheless try to force ask RIM for assistance the next time there's a potential case of illegal activity?
Confusion Before Saturday's Protests over Preah Vihear
Note: This post has been originally published on August 7, 2010 in series of guest blogger posts forBangkok Pundit at AsianCorrespondent.
Veera Somkwamkid, leader of the Thailand Patriot Network (photo courtesy of Eric Seldin aka @thaicam, click here to see the rest of his gallery)
As previously blogged here, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), by the time you read this, are now on the streets again to protest in front of Government House over the ongoing Preah Vihear temple issue, despite the emergency decree - or are they?
Over the course of Friday, developments changed rapidly over the legality of the protests, the venue and in the end who's actually in charge of the protests that have witnessed a fallout between different fraction of the protesters. On Friday morning this was the status quo:
PAD to gather in front of the Govt House starting 8AM tomorrow, to pressure the Govt to cancel MOU43 http://bit.ly/9vptQH
Tweet by @TAN_Network (TAN News Network) on Friday, Aug 06, 2010 at 05:31:44
(Note: TAN News Network is the English language sister channel of ASTV, the PAD's news outlet)
But there were still questions about the legality of the protests, since we still have a state of emergency ever since the anti-government protests some months ago. On this issue, the first conflicting reports appeared. First it was reported the Center for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) has issued that the rally "does not violate the emergency decree". In a way the CRES would legitimize the protester's claim why they don't violate against the state of emergency. Last week, when the same protesters were rallying in front of the Bangkok bureau of UNESCO, many were claiming to "protect the country" so they would not violate the emergency decree.
But then the local police has announced the area around Government House is a no-go area. So, the police disagrees with the army. Well, that's not the first that has ever happened.
Short time later though, ASTV reported that the CRES has done a complete 180 degree turn of its earlier decision and also banned protesters from the site. Later that day, CRES has announced more details on the ruling:
CRES announces Government House 'off limits'; four roads around complex closed from 8pm, violators face two years imprisonment,Bt40,000 fine
Tweet by @MCOTEnglishnews (MCOT English News) on Friday, Aug 06, 2010 at 13:08:52
With the legality dealt there were still confusions on who actually are protesting on Saturday and where to go now since Government House was declared off-limits.
To understand who were are dealing with, it has to be noted that it is not actually the PAD (the yellow shirts) that are leading the latest Preah Vihear protests, but the Thailand Patriot Network (TPN) of Veera Somkwamkid. More on him later, but it can be already said that these two groups are affiliated with each other. Officially, the PAD (especially with Chamlong Srimuang being present all the time) are there just to support this campaign.
The more surprising (or not) was the announcement in the early evening that the PAD would move its protest somewhere else:
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva on Friday said that yellow shirts have agreed to move their rally from the Government House to Kilawes Stadium in Din Daeng area. The decision to move the rally site came after two-hour-and-a-half meeting between Abhisit and representatives of yellow shirts network.
"Yellow rally to move from Government House to a Din Daeng stadium PM", The Nation, August 2010
The Kilawes Stadium is located in the Thai-Japanese Sports Complex in Din Daeng, a Bangkok district that has been constantly the scene of street riots between protesters and soldiers in the past years. It was also reported that the protest has been 'downgraded' to a 'forum' to 'discuss' about this matter. Later, Bangkok Post reported that TPN also agrees to move.
But then in the evening, things have changed again!
Veera's group - Network of Preah Vihear Protectors - is determined to gather outside the PM's office in Government House today as planned. "We don't acknowledge the deal between the prime minister and the other group," Veera declared on television yesterday. [...]
PAD leaders were initially planning to rally in front of Government House to demand that Abhisit revoke the 2000 memorandum of understanding on boundary demarcation with Cambodia as well as voice their opposition to Preah Vihear's inscription as a World Heritage Site.
The Dharma Army Foundation, led by Chamlong Srimuang, later agreed to gather at the Thai-Japanese Stadium in Din Daeng today to express their views, concerns and visions with respect to Preah Vihear. Abhisit was to join the forum later in the day.
However, Veera refused to compromise and continued calling on people to join his protest.
"Defiant PAD group to go ahead with rally", The Nation, August 7, 2010
Evidently, Veera and his group have deflected from the PAD to stage their on protest at Government House, despite the area being sealed off. This apparent split between him and the PAD goes back on a series of incidents and partly some mudslinging between the two. Last year, Veera has led a group of 4,000 protesters under the PAD banner to the Thai-Cambodian border to protest about this very Preah Vihear issue that ended in riots with locals. The following day, the PAD leaders in Bangkok have denied any connections or endorsement to this group and their actions.
Then, earlier this year in June, Veera and the PAD were reported to have fallen out with each other. Matichon has obtained email exchanges between the PAD leaders with the PAD supporter's group in the US and Veera answering questions to someone. In the first mail, the PAD leaders have responded and denied to accusations made by Veera, an anti-corruption activist and until recently host of his own show on ASTV. The accusations includes being overcharged by ASTV to hold his own show, in which as a consequence Veera pulled it off the air and offered it to For Humankind TV (FMTV), that belongs to the religious buddhist sect Santi Asoke, of which PAD leader Chamlong is a devotee. I will not further go into the details of the two mails, as they go too deep to be relevant to this topic.
Nevertheless, it will be interesting to see how and if at all the security authorities will deal with the two protests, especially the one in front of Government House. If the UNESCO protest of last week is anything to go by, it can be expected that the security forces will be far more lenient to the PAD and their affiliated groups than they were with the red shirts. Let alone the fact that prime minister Abhisit has met with these group for talks (again) shows that the what influence they still have over the government and also one must not forget that the yellow shirt leaders still have not been charged for the seizure of Government House and the Bangkok airports in 2008, as they indictments have been repeatedly postponed just as recently as last week.
We can also expect that both these groups will further push their nationalistic agenda under the pretext of 'protecting' the country. Whether the government will give in to the protesters (in a way they already did) or not, this will further complicates the already tense relations between Thailand and Cambodia.
Thailand's Generals Play Musical Chairs - Part 2
Note: This post has been originally published on August 3, 2010 in series of guest blogger posts for Bangkok Pundit at AsianCorrespondent. This is the second part in a two-part series on the upcoming military command reshuffle. In part one, James Harriman has reflected on the new ranks below the commander-in-chief. Today, this post highlights the aspirants on the top army post.
Every September is the time where the Thai military faces the annual game of musical chairs, where the many high-ranking generals are eager for a promotion. With the upcoming retirement of the current commander-in-chief Gen Anupong Paochinda, the question of the successor reveals the still substantial political weight of the kingdom's highest ranking soldier.
But this year though, September can't come fast enough for some.
In fact, Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon has already set July 20 as the deadline for commanders of the armed forces to send in their reshuffle lists to the defence permanent secretary, Gen Apichart Penkitti. These lists could even be in Gen Prawit's hands before the month ends. According to the schedule, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva should be able to send the names for royal endorsement within August.
"Democrats In A Rush To Anoint Prayuth", by Wassana Nanuam, Bangkok Post, July 15, 2010
The government's favorite candidate for the top post is Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha, currently deputy commander-in-chief and a graduate of class 12 of the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School - this is where all future top commanders go through.
Like in many aspects in Thai society, interpersonal relationships and affiliation play a big role in determining the status of a person and his or her chances of being promoted.
To understand the importance of personal relationships and the graduation years inside the army to ascend through the ranks, I recommend reading Paul Chamber's lengthy, but in-depth essay on New Mandala. It also contains a handy list of all the current top army officers.
As Chambers has pointed out, Gen Anupong and Gen Prayuth were ex-commanders of the 21st Infranty Batallion of the Second Army Division, more commonly known as the "Queen's Guard" - a highly influential military unit that also have played a decisive part in the military crackdown against the anti-government red shirt protesters on May 19. This unit has also over the decades been actively supported by Privy Council president Gen Prem Tinsulanond.
Getting back to the government's intentions, one has to look back at the most recent red shirts protests. It is reported that the relationship between prime minister Abhisit had its rough patches since Gen Anupong has shown some hesitation to move against the protesters, while Gen Prayuth has maintained and even improved his ties to the government during the protests, so a promotion to the top rank can be seen as a reward for him.
With the potential appointment of Gen Prayuth comes also a long list of aspirants that are expected to take the seats below him. James Harriman has reflected on that aspect yesterday.
Even though the promotion for Gen Prayuth is almost certain, there are some musings that he might face some competition. Gen Piroon Phaeopolsong, currently army chief-of-staff, is considered to be the dark horse in the race for the next commander-in-chief.
In late July, Matichon Weekly has listed three reasons that could favor him for the top spot: Firstly, Gen Piroon hails from the same cavalry unit as Gen Prem, who himself would like to see one his of kind becoming commander-in-chief (แถมทั้งมีแรงดันจากบ้านสี่เสาเทเวศร์ ที่อยากให้ พล.อ.พิรุณ ซึ่งเป็นทหารม้าลูกป๋า ขึ้นเป็น ผบ.ทบ. สร้างประวัติศาสตร์ให้ทหารม้า มาเป็น ผบ.ทบ. อีกสักคน หลังจากที่ทหารม้าซบเซามาตั้งแต่หมดยุคป๋าเปรม). Also, as both Matichon Weekly and the Bangkok Post (already last year) have pointed out:
Another advantage of Gen Piroon, who has advanced in his career from the cavalry, is that he is regarded as one of Gen Prem Tinsulanonda's proteges. The president of the Privy Council banked on Gen Piroon to make his dream of seeing the set-up of the new 3rd Cavalry Division in Khon Kaen come true. Gen Prem had reportedly made a remark to leading soldiers that, "If I see the 3rd Cavalry Division before I die, I will die peacefully.''
"PM Abhisit, Gen Prayuth and their common future", by Wassana Nanuam, Bangkok Post, December 12, 2009
Secondly, the 2nd Cavalry Division is regarded as one of the leading forces behind the storm on the red shirt protest site from the Sala Daeng area (the Silom intersection) and Gen Piroon, because of his role as army chief-of-staff and his cavalry origins, is regarded as one of the masterminds (กำลังทหารม้าจากกองพลทหารม้าที่ 2 รักษาพระองค์ (พล.ม.2 รอ.) ก็กลายเป็นพระเอก เพราะเป็นกำลังหลักในการบุกเข้ากระชับพื้นที่ด่านศาลาแดง ด่านใหญ่ที่สุดของคนเสื้อแดงที่เชื่อว่าอันตรายที่สุด ซึ่งก็มี พล.อ.พิรุณ ซึ่งเป็นทหารม้าในฐานะ เสธ.ทบ. ก็มีส่วนร่วมวางแผน ).
And lastly, Matichon names the 'Buriram connection' as a factor favoring Piroon, since he hails from the north-eastern province - same as influential and powerful politicians like Newin Chinchob, leader of the Bhumjaithai Party (key coalition partner of the government) and whose relatives are regional power brokers. (สิ่งที่ทำให้ พล.อ.พิรุณ ถูกจับตามองขึ้นมา ทั้งๆ ที่แรงแผ่ว ก็คือ "บุรีรัมย์ คอนเน็กชั่น" ด้วยเพราะเหตุที่เป็นคนบุรีรัมย์ เช่นเดียวกับนักการเมืองคนสำคัญ และฮ็อตที่สุด มีเพาเวอร์ที่สุดในยุคนี้ อย่าง นายเนวิน ชิดชอบ แกนนำพรรคภูมิใจไทย แถมซ้ำมีเครือญาติที่เป็นกำลังหลักในพื้นที่ของนายเนวิน).
Out of all three factors, the 'Buriram connection' appears to be weakest argument, since no political party has a say in military issues except the Democrat Party. Nevertheless, Piroon's Isaan origin could make him a more 'agreeable' candidate among all political factions in contrast to Gen Prayuth, who has not made big efforts to hide his opposition to Thaksin.
Also, Gen Piroon is a graduate of class 10, same as current commander-in-chief Gen Anupong - who is actually reported to favor Piroon to become his successor (ตัว พล.อ.อนุพงษ์ เองก็ไม่ขัดข้องหากเพื่อนรักที่เขาขุนมากับมือ จะขึ้นมาเป็น ผบ.ทบ. ก่อนปีหนึ่ง).
One factor that speaks in favor of Prayuth is that, since he is a class 12 graduate, his retirement will be in 2014. Piroon on the other hand, can only be commander-in-chief for one year. So, it is more likely that he will be pushed to be chairman of the Royal Army Advisory Board, a position that has little influence in the ranks.
So, in the more than likely event that Gen Prayuth becomes commander-in-chief, it will be seen as a further attempt to strengthen the ties between the Democrat-led government and the armed forces. The irony is though that with the impending dissolution case of Democrat Party, the next commander-in-chief will survive the current government and with a new one, the game of musical chairs starts anew.
Further reading & sources:
- Bangkok Post: Democrats in a rush to anoint Prayuth
- Bangkok Post: PM Abhisit, Gen Prayuth and their common future
- Bangkok Post: There's no sitting on the fence for Class 10 alumni
- Bangkok Post: Two key units tighten grip on armed forces
- Matichon Weekly: "ประยุทธ์" ยึด ผบ.ทบ. โผทหารฉบับ "เสือตะวันออก" จับตา "ป๋าป๊อก" กับความฝันหลังเกษียณ (paywall alert!)
- Paul Chambers: The challenges for Thailand’s arch-royalist military
Pongpat's Acceptance Speech - A Lèse Majesté Case?
Note: This article was originally published on July 31, 2010 in a series of guest blogger posts for Bangkok Pundit at AsianCorrespondent.
On May 16, when the street battles between the soldiers and the anti-government protestors were bringing large parts of Bangkok to a grinding halt for days already, elsewhere life went on as nothing has happened as for example the Nataraj Awards, the national television and radio awards, took place that evening.
The most notable moment during the award ceremony was the acceptance speech of actor Pongpat Wachirabanjong for best supporting actor. Here's the video with English subtitles.
[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/v/6xYfbUIGqW4&w=600&h=360]
The speech has, as evidently seen in the video, touched many Thais and hit a nerve among a certain people. It was forwarded via email, Twitter and heralded as the 'best speech ever' or 'or true patriotic act of loyalty'.
Last week, the very same actor has been hit with a legal charge for lèse majesté...
Actor Pongpat Wachirabanjong will be summoned to hear his lese majeste charges on July 29, and if he fails to show up after two summons have been issued, police will seek an arrest warrant for the man, Deputy Bangkok Police Chief Pol MajGeneral Amnuay Nimmano said yesterday.
The police are also planning to invite witnesses, lawyers and Thai language experts to listen to the actor's acceptance speech at this year's Nataraj Awards as part of the investigation. Amnuay said the case should be concluded within a month.
Despite media and social networks describing Pongpat's speech as a moving declaration of his love for His Majesty, singer Phumpat Wongyachavalit filed a lese majeste complaint against the actor on June 23, accusing him of using inappropriate words.
"Pongpat summoned to hear charges", The Nation, July 22, 2010
Police Wednesday summoned Pongpat to surrender to face lese majesty charge after a singer filed complaint with police, alleging Pongpat had insulted His Majesty the King by simply calling His Majesty as "father".
"PM says police should consult special advisory panel on Pongpat's case", The Nation, July 22, 2010
This is certainly a very odd case, since the use of the word "father" (or more correctly "Father") in connection to HM the King is widely used in Thai language.
Even the prime minister got involved in this case and has suggested that the police should contact a recently set-up advisory board that deals with these kind of cases. The result came back very quick and the case against Pongpat has now been (unsurprisingly) dropped.
Nevertheless this whole strange act again shows the discrepancies of the authorities dealing with lèse majesté cases. (I'm NOT discussing the law itself!) One can be amazed by the speed the police has dealt with this charge - from filing until the dismissal it took only just more than a month. Also, no efforts have been wasted, language experts have been invited by the police to determine whether the use of word in this context was illegal or not. There are other more obvious cases that are still lingering in legal limbo.
The other point is Pongpat's speech itself. The key phrase "If you hate our Father, if you don't love our Father anymore, then you should get out of here!", which was followed by the audience cheering and applauding enthusiastically, sets a worrying subtext of "if you're not for us, you're against us" - and even more scarier was the reaction by the crowd.