Thailand's armed forces: Overemphasizing the loyalty
Originally published at Siam Voices on April 21, 2011 When General Prayuth Chan-ocha took over as commander-in-chief of Thailand's armed forces last year, he made in no uncertain terms right off the bat what his top priorities are: protecting the royal institution and going after everything and everyone that is deemed a threat to it. Since then, he apparently still is not tired to emphasize this.
On Tuesday, the army staged a mock exercise with about 1,100 soldiers, various types of weapons, vehicles and helicopters amid heavy rain in Bangkok, under the theme of protecting the monarchy and apparently also to show that the armed forces are unified, despite reports of possible dissent in the ranks.
“All from the 1st Infantry Regiment are the King’s soldiers. Hence, you must be ready to act on commands of your superiors,” Maj Gen Kampanat told the gathering of infantrymen.
He told them to have faith in their commanders and to strictly obey their orders, and insisted that all soldiers should share the army chief’s stance.
"Show of strength to protect monarchy", Bangkok Post, April 20, 2011
This show of force comes after Prayuth himself has lodged a lese majeste-complaint against Jatuporn Prompan, United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) co-leader and Puea Thai Party MP, and several other red shirt supporters for allegedly making inappropriate comments against the monarchy during a rally on April 10, 2011 marking the anniversary of the bloody clashes. (Sidenote: the accused are suing back)
This was just the last one in a series of actions Prayuth has taken in recent weeks all with the emphasis to protect the monarchy and telling others not to misuse the royal institution for their own gain. Pravit Rojanaphruk has listed some of these in a recent story in The Nation:
Here are just some of the hats that Army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha has put on over the past few weeks: (...)
- That of a not-so-convincing denier of coup rumours: Prayuth can never be convincing on this subject because of the role he played in the 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin Shinawatra. How can he, who was involved in a coup then be denying the threat now?
- That of an adviser to all Thai voters: "Vote to protect monarchy" was the instruction from Prayuth that this newspaper carried on its front page last week. He was also quoted as saying that a high turnout was the key to safeguarding the monarchy and democracy. But what if the majority of Thai voters vote for the "wrong" party? Will there be another military coup? He also believes that all Thais know who to blame for the ongoing political crisis. "Everyone knows the culprits behind the lost lives and the injuries incurred [last April and May]," he was quoted as saying. Surely, he can't be serious.
- That of chief censor and promoter of the lese majeste law: Prayuth has ordered the Information and Communication Technology Ministry to block more websites and has told his soldiers to file lese majeste charges against red-shirt leaders for what they allegedly said during the April 10 rally. This was even before the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) and police could make a move.
These are just some of the many hats that Prayuth has enjoyed wearing recently, though one can't help but wonder if they really fit an Army chief.
"An army chief who dons too many hats", by Pravit Rojanaphruk, The Nation, April 20, 2011 (hyperlinks inserted by me)
Prayuth repeatedly claims that the monarchy is above politics and thus should not be dragged into political activities. The problem is though, as Voranai Vanijaka lamented in a Bangkok Post op-ed, that the blatant overemphasizing of the loyalty to the royal institution and the act of accusing others the lack thereof is used solely for political gain and thus exactly affects the monarchy in a way that is explicitly (at least officially) not supposed to be, as Pavin Chachavalpongpun notes:
The military may be exploiting its role as protector of the monarchy to legitimize its own involvement in politics, but in the process it is also further politicizing the institution. (...)
The lese-majeste law is a devastatingly effective political weapon. But the more politicians abuse it, the more they damage the monarchy. In the worst-case scenario, it could become a self-fulfilling accusation. By backing the red shirts into a corner where their criticisms of the elites are accused of being anti-monarchy, the government could split society on the role of the monarchy.
"Thailand's Military on the Offensive", by Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2011
This whole trend has already backfired on the army, which also is re-politicized ever since the 2006 coup, and continues to do since Prayuth began as commander-in-chief, much to his disadvantage:
First things first. Gen Prayuth probably has come out to speak on the same issue once too often, so nobody seems to care about his message any longer. (...)
That is because the army chief has already dragged the army into politics by showing support for some political parties and thus turning himself into an enemy of the opposition. The move has made the army vulnerable to attacks from politicians annoyed with Gen Prayuth.
"Tussle of the two Tu's - one red and the other green", Bangkok Post, April 21, 2011
Now, with all political parties stopping to mention the monarchy in their activities, either voluntarily (like the UDD did, despite the fight against the indiscriminate use of the lese-majeste-law against them being one of their main points) or involuntarily (with the election commission essentially issuing a gag order to all political parties, much to the dismay of e.g. Bhum Jai Thai, who recently handed out millions of royal portraits to, again, emphasizing their loyalty), it leaves the army to follow suit and tone down, if it does not want to be at the receiving end of it's own heavy campaigning.
P.S.: This whole overemphasizing-thingy sometimes lead to unusual remarks such as by a regional commander, who referred to himself as a "slave to the King and the country" (original sentence: "ในฐานะที่เป็นผู้บังคับบัญชาทหารในพื้นที่ภาค 2 ที่เป็นกำลังสำคัญในการปกป้องประเทศชาติ เป็นข้าทาสของในหลวง และแผนดินไทย", source: Daily News) - I guess 'servant' wasn't enough for him.
h/t to Andrew Spooner for links and tips
Thai military quashes coup rumors yet again
Originally published at Siam Voices on April 6, 2011 Thailand's military has yet again denied any rumors of a coup and that the armed forces would not intervene in an upcoming election later this year. After a monthly meeting of senior military officers, in a joint statement on Tuesday supreme commander Songkitti Jaggabatara, in attendance of army chief Prayuth Chan-ocha, navy commander Kamthorn Phumhiran and air force chief Itthaporn Subhawong, said:
Gen Songkitti said there would "definitely not be a coup". The armed forces operate under the constitution and support democratic rule, he said. [...]
"Any military unit which moves troops out of barracks without permission will be deemed to have committed insurrection. Feel free to file complaints against any soldier who conducts any political activity to pressure you. If there are grounds to the complaints, I will order an inquiry," he said before his announcement was broadcast yesterday. [...]
"Stop linking the armed forces [to the coup rumours]. Don't ever separate the military from the people," he said, adding that the military would work hand in hand with members of the public to ensure the country moves forward.
"Military leaders unified against a coup", Bangkok Post, April 6, 2011
Some noteworthy points here: This is yet another denial of a coup rumors, which have boiled up quite frequently in recent months, mostly fueled by the political opposition. The Thai Report has counted 11 denials so far in this year alone, which given the circumstances not too surprising with an election expected in the near future and the burning question what the military will do if the opposition Puea Thai Party wins and potentially swaps out high-ranking officers.
Some political observers [...] reckon that a Puea Thai-led administration may have more than a few scores to settle. One of them is to remove any standing legacy of the 2006 coup and, if that is true, Gen Prayuth could be shown the door if the party makes its way into Government House. [...]
The moment of truth for Gen Prayuth would come in September, which is reshuffle time and the most crucial career juncture for many ambitious soldiers.
This year, many major military posts will be left vacant. Supreme Commander Songkitti Jaggabatara and defence permanent secretary Kittipong Ketkowit will go into mandatory retirement, paving the way for a potential shake-up where other active top brass could ''move around''.
Gen Prayuth, who retires in three years, may be moved to succeed either Gen Songkitti or Gen Kittipong. But that depends on how strong a sentiment for reconciliation there is prevailing. If there comes a need for a ''colour-neutral'' chief, then Gen Prayuth may have to move aside.
"Whose finger on the trigger?", Bangkok Post, March 26, 2011
The article goes on to mention that the previous Puea Thai-incarnations during the Samak and Somchai governments have made sure to maintain a good relationship to the military (which in the end didn't help though) as does the current government with granting military toys (see previous coverage here and here) among other things. It'd be indeed interesting to see if a PT-led government would uproot all the officers loyal to Prayuth, a move to prevent dissent against him, and plant their people instead.
But for now, sadly the rule of thumb again is, with such a re-politicized military, a coup is never fully out of the question.
Thai deputy PM: Protesters died because they ran into bullets
Originally published at Siam Voices on March 8, 2011 Here's a quote by deputy prime minister Suthep Thaugsuban from a few days ago:
เราไม่คิดเข่นฆ่าประชาชน ไม่เคยใช้กำลังเจ้าหน้าที่ตำรวจทหารเข้าสลายการชุมนุม แต่ที่ตายเพราะวิ่งเข้ามาใส่
We had no intentions to kill our people, we have never ordered the police and the army to use force during the dispersal of the [red shirt] protest but those [who got] killed ran into [the bullets]*.
""เทือก"ลั่นได้ 300 เสียงไม่ง้อ "เนวิน-เติ้ง" แนะจับตาศึกซักฟอกศอกกลับฝ่ายค้าน", ASTV, March 5, 2011
I don't where to start here...! First off, this remark was done during a lecture called "Democrat Ideology" ("อุดมการณ์ประชาธิปัตย์") at a seminar named "The new generation, the Thai future" ("รุ่นใหม่ อนาคตไทย"). More can be read here in Thai.
Suthep has always been a gaffe-tastic politician, who regularly puts his foot in mouth. But this is a new low even for him. Is he really suggesting that these 90 killed and thousands of injured people were just unlucky to ran into the bullets? Is he suggesting the Japanese cameraman and the Italian journalist were victims of their own fault because they ran into the crossfire? Are the nurses and medical workers killed because they just couldn't wait to treat the wounded until the shooting is over? Were those six killed at Wat Pathum Wanaram accidentally shot because they ran for cover from the soldiers on the elevated Skytrain tracks shooting at them? How far can anyone be further from reality?
I could go on forever with this rant, but this shows that Suthep, the DSI and all other authorties are dishonest and not caring about the truth, since it means to take responsibility. All the talks about fear that a hasted investigation might cause unrest is just an excuse not to face the problems at hand and what they seem to realized the least is that the more this drags on, the more attempts to put a blanket over what happened, the wound will not heal and this will eventually lead to more unrest!
h/t to @KrisKoles and Bangkok Pundit
UPDATE: In case anyone thinks that Suthep was misquoted by one source there, you can read this very quote not only at ASTV, but also at Khao Sod, Thai Rath, Spring News and also on Suthichai Yoon's site - they all report the same insane quote!
UPDATE 2: As Bangkok Pundit points out in his take on the story the same quote also appeared on state media channel MCOT and astonishingly also on the website of the RTAF’s Directorate of Intelligence. Also, the fact that not one single Thai news organization has not picked up on this story, neither Thai or English language, speaks volume...!
*Note: For the sake of transparency it should be noted that the brackets were added at a later time.
Unarmed forces: Thai army suffers first weapon theft of the year
Originally published at Siam Voices Media outlets have reported on Friday that over 130 weapons have been stolen from an army arsenal at 1st Infantry Battalion at the army's Infantry Centre in Prachuap Khiri Khan province. The disappearance was noted during an inspection by a commander of the battalion and quickly reported local police on Thursday night. The weapons missing make up quite an impressive loot:
Capt Apiwat [Saengsoong, a company commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion] said the weapons found to be missing were: 117 M16 rifles, ten 11mm handguns, ten rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, five M79 grenade launchers, four M60 machine guns, one 60mm mortar, four Minimi light machineguns and a large quantity of assorted ammunition.
"Guns missing from arsenal, sergeant-major flees", Bangkok Post, February 4, 2011
During the day, some weapons have been found though:
On Friday morning Lt-Col Manorot and military police went to search the house of a sergeant major who was suspected to have stolen the weapons, and found part of the missing arsenal. However, the sergeant major was not there. He fled before military police arrived.
"Guns missing from arsenal, sergeant-major flees", Bangkok Post, February 4, 2011
Army weapons being stolen are a regular occurrence with at least two similar incidents reported in the last 12 months - the last one in September in Lop Buri and the other in March earlier that year from a base in the southern province of Phatthalung. In both incidents, there were no signs of break-ins or any other traces of force. All-in-all, a pretty big embarrassment for the armed forces.
The question now in such cases is what happens with the weapons and where do they go. In this particular case, the suspicion seems to be already very clear:
The source said the sergeant major who had fled was known to be involved in illegal arms trading. Nobody knew which groups he had sold weapons to -- be they Karen on the Thai-Burmese border, the red-shirts or southern insurgents.
"Guns missing from arsenal, sergeant-major flees", Bangkok Post, February 4, 2011
Also, to underline that this is not a new phenomenon The Straits Times wrote about this matter back in October.
Most of this war material went overland to insurgents in Burma and Laos, (...) But it is the domestic sourcing that is likely most relevant to the unsettled atmosphere now prevalent in Thailand.
Weaponry obtained in Thailand and destined for the black market trade originated mainly from local military stocks or from unscrupulous arms dealers. (...)
"According to a Bangkok-based intelligence source," I wrote in 2000, "one method of siphoning from Thai army stocks involves over-reporting the amount of ammunition consumed during training exercises."
The paper further notes: "Locally- sourced military equipment is largely purloined from Royal Thai Army stocks. This includes material simply stolen from storage areas and material obtained with the collusion of corrupt military personnel who over-report usage and siphon off the excess.
"Arms trafficking in Thailand not a new phenomenon", by Robert Karniol, The Straits Times, October 18, 2010
The author points out the attempts to link the disappearance of the weapons to radical, violent elements of the red shirts or a third party inciting chaos in order to destabilize the national security and to discredit any anti-government movement, as seen during the red shirt protests last year where numerous explosions have occurred, mostly by M79 grenade launchers.
Shortly after the weapons theft in March 2010, there was a certain amount of fear that these would be used during the red shirts' protest that began shortly thereafter. Now we have yet another theft and also another upcoming red shirt protest next week - so let's see how long it will take until the finger pointing starts.
BONUS: For those who understand Thai I recommend to watch this post by @thaitvnews, where it shows that the army has denied the disappearance a few times until they have finally admitted that the weapons are gone...!
A new cavalry unit in Thailand's north-east: Old wish, new threat?
Originally published at Siam Voices on March 2, 2011 The Thai military is getting a new cavalry unit near the north-eastern town of Khon Kaen. The cabinet has recently approved the formation of the 3rd Cavalry Unit (essentially a division of tanks) that will cost 70bn Baht ($2.3bn). This is also a treat for privy council president Prem Tinsulanonda, who has mentioned that a third cavalry unit is a long-held one last wish, since he himself hails from the cavalry. But why is this approved now:
The new division of tanks will be a supportive unit for the Second Army Region serving along the northeastern border with Cambodia and Laos. (...)
Tanks played a key role in the fresh clash between the two neighbours when heavy weapons, including tank artillery, were involved at the border area near the Preah Vihear Temple from February 4-7.
"Cabinet approves new Army divisions", The Nation, February 2, 2011
Of course, why not use the recent clashes at the border as good opportunity to request more troops, equipment, vehicles and thus more money - not that the army isn't getting enough new toys in recent months.
But before the recent clashes at the Thai-Cambodian border the reasons for the new cavalry unit were a bit different:
The idea of setting up a 3rd Cavalry Division arose from army restructuring. The changing national security situation and perceived threats were taken into consideration when deciding on the restructuring, the supreme commander said.
"Cavalry unit for Khon Kaen eases closer", Bangkok Post, January 7, 2011
"National security situation"? I wonder what that means? Let's go back to last summer:
Apart from the 7th Division, the army also plans to set up the 3rd Cavalry Division in Khon Kaen. (...) Although sources said that the set-up of the two divisions will be developed concurrently, the 7th Infantry Division looks set to progress faster than the 3rd Cavalry as it requires a shorter time and smaller budget. The 3rd Cavalry division will require a budget of about 70 billion baht to establish, plus a timeframe of about 10 years. (...)
Politically speaking, there is every reason to believe that the 7th Division will be set up sooner than the 3rd Cavalry, especially when considering the mission of battling Thaksin Shinawatra and the red shirts, a task for which the government has no one to rely on but the military. With the 7th Division in place, the government would certainly benefit.
"Red presence forces military to establish new division", Bangkok Post, July 29, 2010
Oh, of course! Since Khon Kaen is considered to be a red shirts stronghold it does only make sense for the government and the army to try to gain more control over the region. Now what would they do?
After the crowd dispersal at Ratchaprasong intersection in Bangkok, the army under the Isoc recorded the names and addresses as well as ID cards of the red shirts involved before releasing them. The army then visited them at home to try to provide "healing" in its own inimitable way.
"Red presence forces military to establish new division", Bangkok Post, July 29, 2010
Guess these people are in the same annoyance level of door-to-door salesman and missionaries. Kidding aside, the plans to speed up all these military projects show the original intent of the armed forces -control of its own people. And with a military chief determined to protect the nation's highest institutions from what he sees as their enemies, one can see why. On the other hand though the military is at the moment busy with fighting at the Cambodian border for very dubious reasons.
Saksith Saiyasombut is a Thai journalist and blogger still based in Hamburg, Germany. He can be followed on Twitter @Saksith.
Thailand journalist death: More criticism of DSI probe
Originally published at Siam Voices on March 2, 2011 The most recent findings of Thailand's Department of Special Investigation (DSI) that the death of Japanese cameraman Hiro Muramoto during the clashes in Bangkok last April was not caused by the military draws more criticism (see our most recent coverage here and here). Both the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reuters have voiced their concern about the findings and have pointed out the contradictions.
The DSI claims to have found "AK-47 bullet wound patterns" on Muramoto's body and since the Thai military is officially not using this rifle, they absolved the soldiers of any fault - despite contradicting a previous report that the Reuters cameraman was killed by a shot after "gunfire flashed from the direction of soldiers". Furthermore, there have been rumors that this comes after the army's chief of staff paid the DSI a visit to protest the previous finding.
Shortly after the announcement on Sunday, the Bangkok Post reported via a source how the DSI actually came to this conclusion:
The source said that while Pol Lt Gen Amporn might be providing advice to the DSI, he was not among the people who observed the autopsy to determine the cause of death of Muramoto. He was overseas at the time. Pol Lt Gen Amporn only analysed the cause of Muramoto's death from photos of the wounds on his body and concluded that the wounds were caused by an AK-47 rifle.
The panel itself had concluded that Muramoto was hit by two bullets fired from a high velocity gun, once in the head and the other in the heart, the source said. Given the pattern of his gun wounds, it was believed he was shot dead by a sniper, and normally snipers use an M16 rifle, not an AK, the source said.
The panel did not reach a conclusion about the exact type of weapons used in the killing of Muramoto and the other people because no bullets were found in any of the examined bodies, the source said.
"No firm view on AK-47 role in deaths", Bangkok Post, January 28, 2011
The latest to slam the DSI's finding is Metropolitan Police Bureau deputy chief Pol. Lt.-General Amnuay Nimmano. He said to the media that:
He said the DSI jumped to the conclusion the fatal shot must have been fired from the direction of a group of red shirts confronting the troops. For this information they relied on the dead man's camera, in which the last shots shown were of soldiers.
"It turns out that the camera's lens was covered, and the camera did not work the moment he was shot. A person can turn in any direction when [hit by a bullet]," said Amnuay. (...)
"It's DSI's own theory, own leads, own investigation and own conclusion, without police getting involved, and based on nothing convincing or credible. To put it simply, the conclusion is simply muddled," Amnuay said.
"Police refute DSI finding on shot cameraman", The Nation, March 3, 2011
My take: The moment I read about bullet patterns, I was (more than usually) skeptical. No bullets, just patterns!
As pointed out by in the comments on my previous article, even though the army does not use the AK-47 rifle it uses the same kind of 7.62 caliber bullets. These bullets are also used by the SR-25 and the SSG 3000 - both are sniper rifles used by the Thai armed forces. Military snipers were seen numerous times during the protests, especially during the crackdown in May 2010, and multiple witnesses claim to have seen armed men shooting from above during the April 10 clashes as well. So there is a possibility that Muramoto has been shot - deliberately or not - by military soldiers.
The DSI and their fact-finding are losing more credibility (not that they had much to begin with) with this apparent u-turn and with their inability to full shrug off rumors of colluding with the military, there's no other verdict than that this an active cover-up to evade full responsibility.
h/t to ricefieldradio for the aforementioned pointer
Thailand's DSI: Cameraman not killed by soldiers during 2010 protests
Originally published at Siam Voices on February 27, 2011 The Department of Special Investigation has revealed new evidence regarding the death of Japanese Reuters cameraman Hiro Muramoto, who was killed while covering the violent clashes on April 10 last year during the red shirts protests, that re-interprets the circumstances:
The army is breathing a sigh of relief after a Department of Special Investigation (DSI) report concluded troops were not responsible for the death of a Japanese cameraman during last year's red shirt protests.
However, the relief may be short-lived, amid claims that the army chief of staff paid the DSI head a visit to complain about an initial department finding which claimed the opposite - that soldiers should in fact be blamed for Japanese cameraman Hiroyuki Muramoto's death during the rally at Khok Wua intersection on April 10 last year.
The DSI is likely to face questions about why it changed its stance, though DSI director-general Tharit Pengdit yesterday stood by the latest report, saying it was based on scientific and forensic findings. He also denied meeting the army chief of staff.
The weapons report, which he did not release, found that the Reuters News Agency cameraman was shot dead with an AK-47 rifle while covering the clashes. In that case, troops could not be blamed for the death, said the report, because they carried different weapons.
Mr Tharit said Muramoto's body was found with AK-47 bullet wound patterns. Soldiers had not used the weapon, he said.
"DSI changes ruling on cameraman's death", Bangkok Post, February 27, 2011
This comes after an earlier DSI report, which has been leaked to Reuters, showing that...
Muramoto, a 43-year-old Japanese national based in Tokyo, was killed by a high-velocity bullet wound to the chest while covering protests in Bangkok's old quarter.
The report quoted a witness who said Muramoto collapsed as gunfire flashed from the direction of soldiers. Thailand's government has not yet publicly released the report into his death despite intense diplomatic pressure from Japan.
"Exclusive: Probe reveals Thai troops' role in civilian deaths", Reuters, December 10, 2010
The DSI explains this contradiction with the presence of armed, black-clad men, that reportedly roamed the streets during the clashes and were either allegedly red shirt security guards of rouge red shirt General Seh Daeng (who honestly was a loose canon - no one was really sure what he and his men were up to) or allegedly a 'third hand' to deliberately create chaos, depending on who's making these allegations. But, to adapt what Bangkok Pundit said at one time, it could have been the mysterious gunmen standing next to the soldiers, which they didn't notice anyhow. On the other hand though...
An army source (...) also said the army had imported about 20,000 AK-47 rifles into the country two decades ago. About 19,000 of them had been distributed for use at military camps nationwide, while the rest were kept at the army's weapon storage site.
"DSI changes ruling on cameraman's death", Bangkok Post, February 27, 2011
No doubt that the investigations into the circumstances of the many people killed during the protests last year is an impossibly difficult task. It can be expected that gathering evidence and witness accounts will be an uphill battle, especially when dealing with government authorities who are either unwilling to cooperate or directly intervene as indicated above. But also lot of pressure is coming from the red shirts demanding clarification and, more importantly, responsibility.
What is more important, though, is that the probes have to be thorough and impartial. With many cases still inconclusive (including the death of the other foreign journalist Fabio Polenghi), the DSI investigations so far do not help to ease the tensions in this still volatile political atmosphere, where one side is demanding the truth and the other side apparently fearing that the truth will create unrest. But this increases the dissatisfaction (and impatience) even more and leaves yet another wound in the Thai historical soul.
Thailand’s Groundhog Day: Rumors of a military coup
Originally published at Siam Voices on February 2, 2011 Thailand faces an increased amount of rumors about a military coup again in the last few weeks with the latest being spewed out by Admiral Bannawit Kengrian:
The countdown to another military coup has begun, former deputy permanent secretary for defence Admiral Bannawit Kengrian said on Tuesday. [...] He said there were several reasons for the military to stage a coup.
There were many failures in the political sector. The people could no longer rely on politicians., independent agencies were weak, people banned from politics could still direct political activities and the Election Commission could not do anything about them.
Many groups of people of different political colours were out on the streets. Seeing no way out, the people would look to the military to break the impasse.
"Bannawit: Coup countdown has begun", Bangkok Post, February 1, 2011
So far, so predictable. The scenario Bannawit draws here has been going on for months now and with the red shirts regularly rallying and the yellow shirts now camping out for over a week now, things don't seem to change. But here is where his hypothesis beings to fall apart:
"The situation in this country is no different to that in Egypt. The people can no longer tolerate the political system and their protests are always fruitless. So they turn to the military," Adm Bannawit said. (...)
But from his experience in taking part in the 2006 coup, and several previous ones, and his personal acquaintance with nearly every politician and military officer, there were signs of a coup.
This time, it was the people that would join hands with the military to revolutionize the country and to stop the wicked cycle of politics. (...)
"Bannawit: Coup countdown has begun", Bangkok Post, February 1, 2011
It seems to be popular at the moment to draw parallels to the popular revolts in Tunisia and Egypt with Thailand. I hope to elaborate on this topic at a later point, but I can already say that this assertion doesn't really hold up. I'm especially certain that only a marginal size will side with the Thai army and I'm highly doubtful that the army is a constructive element to break free a political deadlock - at least he wasn't talking about democracy.
Also mentioned earlier, the rumors of a imminent coup are being thrown around in an almost inflationary amount in the last few weeks, almost a carbon copy of last year as pointed out by fellow Siam Voices writer Newley Purnell. It begun with red shirt co-leader and Puea Thai MP Jatuporn Prompan drawing his conclusions from a meeting of high-ranking military officers, then all sides (even his own party) denying his claims, followed up by a soothsayer (who are unfortunately still getting way too much attention, especially on political 'predictions') 'predicting' a 'drastic change' in April or May with a new prime minister, whose initial is allegedly 'P' or 'D', followed by an annoyed commander-in-chief Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha rejecting all rumors. And then there's Bannawit's recent prediction:
A countdown had begun to a coup, which could come in a few weeks, not a year or months.
"Bannawit: Coup countdown has begun", Bangkok Post, February 1, 2011
While it should be widely known by now that a coup is hardly the all-solving carte blanche, the mere fact that these rumors are flying around persistently indicates a sad reality that given the increased influence and the revitalized politicization of the military since 2006, another coup is never fully out of question.
Thai Navy plans to buy submarines from Germany
Originally published at Siam Voices on January 23, 2011 The Bangkok Post reports
The Royal Thai Navy wants to buy two second-hand submarines at a cost of 6-7 billion baht [$195m - $228m]. [...]
The specifications of the submarines have not been determined but the navy is expected to buy them from European suppliers, probably Germany.
The navy has stressed the need to acquire submarines because Thai sailors have little knowledge of submarine technology, which is constantly upgraded.
"Several neighbouring countries have submarines at their disposal. But Thai sailors have never come into contact with submarines. We are still backwards in terms of submarine technology," said the source. [...]
The plan has the backing of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who wants the armed forces to improve their capabilities in what is seen as a return of favours to the military for standing by the government in dealing with the red shirts during last year's protests.
"Navy wants to buy 2 subs", Bangkok Post, January 22, 2011
A local German paper, Kieler Nachrichten, reported recently that the Thai Navy wants to buy six used type 206 submarines from Germany. It continues:
Thailand's ministry of defense has promised their navy 500 million Euros [$681m] for the construction of a submarine flotilla in last March.
Bilateral talks between Berlin and Bangkok have already taken place. When the purchase contract with Thailand is ready to be signed is not known by this time. But the boats have already been inspected. The planned relocation of the submarines from Eckernförde to Wilhelmshaven for decommissioning has been stopped shortly thereafter.
"Chancen stehen gut: Großauftrag für HDW in Sicht", Kieler Nachrichten, January 18, 2011, translation by me
The story goes on that the Kiel dockyard company HDW is tipped to be contracted with the maintenance and preparation for the handover of the submarines, which is scheduled after March.
The Royal Thai Navy has long desired to buy new submarines for some time now (read here and here), including the suspected involvement of arms dealer Viktor Bout. The necessity though is debatable to say the least. Navy officials are repeatedly citing various reasons ranging from economic reasons (in the sense of securing trade routes by sea) to a "strong bargaining power in international negotiations" (source), which is clearly an offensive, if not aggressive, stance against its neighboring countries. While Thailand is so far the only one in the region that maintains an aircraft carrier, others like Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore have or are in the process of acquiring submarines, leading to the suggestion of an arms race.
That said, according to Richard A. Bitzinger, Senior Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, even though it is not an arms race per se, it has its consequences:
If Southeast Asia is in the midst of an arms dynamic, as it would appear, it may still have a deleterious effect on regional security. Relatively considerable sums of monies are being spent on weaponry, perhaps with little regard to their actual usefulness in military situations (at least, the kind of likely military situations that would occur in the region), and the deployment of these weapons are no less potentially distressing to the regional security dynamic, especially if some event were to push the region into conflict. On the other hand, the acceptance that the region is in an arms dynamic and not an arms race means that the situation is not immutable and that the problem of arms proliferation in the region is resolvable, [...] easily comprehended, bounded and constrained. The cycle can be broken or mitigated, and it is certainly within the power of the local states to do so, should they choose to do so.
Bitzinger, Richard A.: "A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions", in: Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 32, Number 1, April 2010
From a domestic angle, this is another one in a long list of the proposed equipment procurement of the army (see previous story on Ukrainian APCs and German engines to Thailand). In the greater scheme of things, this is also the result of the Thai government granting the army a bigger budget in order to secure their support. A Bangkok Post story from March 2010 (in anticipation of the red shirts protests) suggested that the armed forces were to file in their wish lists. Since the protests have been dispersed by the army, the government is now owing the rewards to them - no matter how useless, impractical or dubious these soon-to-be mothballed big toys will be.
General Prayuth's Wish List for 2011
Originally published at Siam Voices on December 29, 2010 It seems that Thailand's army commander-in-chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha is already being more outspoken in public (with a public outburst being his last outing) than his predecessor(s) in such a short time, considering he just took up the post in October.
This week, he outlined four points on his wish list for the new year. Let's go one by one, shall we?
"For the people and army personnel to enjoy the New Year" Well, duh! Nothing much to explain here.
"For the monarchy not to be offended" He's got that point covered as well after the announced his crackdown on all anti-monarchists and he has put this on the top of his priority list during his tenure.
"For peace to return quickly to the southern border provinces" If there's any superficial sign of improvement or at least what the authorities want to signal to us, then the apparent upcoming end of the state of emergency in one district in Pattani might be one - even though it will be replaced by the Internal Security Act (ISA). The same happened in Bangkok last week.
"For sustainable peace on the borders with neighbouring countries." Of course this is a reference to the ongoing dispute over Preah Vihear temple at the Thai-Cambodian border. Prayuth added that "unsettled border disputes should not be raised unnecessarily because doing so would only make people become emotional." Well, let's see if he'll stick to his words when the PAD will protest about this very issue on January 25, 2011 or if he'll let them pass.
But wait, there's more!
Asked about the army's stand on politics, Gen Prayuth said the army must not side with any parties in conflict but must maintain and adhere to the law, regardless of who is the government, to prevent casualties to the people.
The army chief said the people should no longer talk about which colour they belong to, because this would only prolong the conflict between them.
He promised not to lead the army in another coup, because it is against the law. "Nobody wants a coup and the chance of there not being another coup is 100 per cent," Gen Prayuth said.
"Gen Prayuth's New Year wishes", Bangkok Post, December 28, 2010
Firstly, if a flawed opinion poll from earlier this year is anything to go by, then the army shouldn't be influenced by politics at all anyways. Secondly, if Prayuth advises people to go color-blind, then he himself should stick to his own words as well, since he was allegedly promoting and demoting army officers for political reasons.
And finally, about the pledge not to stage coup - well, we'll have to see about that...
How Much Did The CRES Cost? Don't Ask General Prayuth About It!
Originally published at Siam Voices on December 23, 2010 After the state of emergency has been lifted in Bangkok and three other provinces on Tuesday it was also time for the CRES, which overlooked the security situation (and made it's spokesperson Col. Sansern to an instant celebrity), to be dissolved. Now after the monitoring body is no more (but is essentially replaced with another one), questions were popping up about the total cost to maintain the CRES. The Bangkok Post reported:
Although sources at the army insist they have records to show the CRES's bills came to just over 2 billion baht [US$ 66,3m], figures previously revealed by military officers indicated the cost of running the centre might have been much higher. [...]
Army sources said the army's accountant reported that the CRES spent 2.04 billion baht in total. Most of the money went on officers' allowances and expenses for fuel and vehicles.
Gen Pirun Paewponsaeng earlier revealed when he was army chief of staff that the CRES's expenses between April 7 and May 25 alone stood at 1.9 billion baht [US$ 63m]. The Internal Security Operations Command, which was then under CRES supervision, spent another 2.08 billion baht [US$ 93m] during the same period.
"Deputy PM insists CRES spending above board", Bangkok Post, December 23, 2010
Reporters attempted to ask commander-in-chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha about this and his response was, erm, very straightforward...
[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdTktx7MsMs&w=600&h=360]"ข่าว บิ้กตู่ฟิวส์ขาด ปรี๊ดแตก", video by @thaitvnews
And here's a translation of what he said:
Why? Where did you get this budget of hundred-thousands and millions? Where did you get that?! These are only work compensations! That many officials work that much and you multiply that, simple! Where did you get that number? (Taunting) Huh?! Ask the person you get that from, it's from one of here [the reporters]!
(Reporter: "So what is the total cost?")
I don't know! Look it up yourselves! I want you to let you know that if you want the officials to do their work, this country to be safe, then stop with the rumors! Such nonsense you people write! The the government does this and that to - erm, not the government, the army! - buys this and that; what do I get out of this?! I ask you who benefits from the purchases? Thailand, or not?! Who gets the perks? I don't know, but I don't - nobody does! Go and get your facts about what this country needs to buy to protect this country! You all say 'we shouldn't buy this, we shouldn't buy that' and if we buy, then you shout 'corruption' - show me the evidence! [If you keep asking that, soon] nobody wants to work [for the army] and protect the country! You'll destroy one by one until there's no one left! So go and find a new one! Let's help build up something!
(Reporters: "Then please tell us how much money the CRES used...")
I won't! I won't because I'm clean! Tell you about what? Why? Have I done something wrong?
(Reporter: "If you don't explain, there'll be doubts abou...")
Why?! Go and ask the government, let them explain! All the expenses, they'll tell! If I need to explain [about] everything, then I won't get any work done! I have already told you, I don't get anything, the army doesn't as well. The ones who got it are the officials who have eaten and slept on the ground each and every day. Why, are they not Thais? Are they not human? Huh?! Are they not human?! Don't they need money? Or don't they need to eat? Go and keep an eye on them, go - I have enough...! (walks away)
(Translation and emphasis by me)
It wasn't so much what he said rather than how he spoke to the reporters about this issue that underlines his clear perception of himself, the armed forces and the country. By the looks of it, he still has a lot of work to convince us. It goes without saying that many past purchases of the army were sketchy and, in the case of the bogus GT200 device, their use for the country are to be questioned.
So the reporters then went to the government to ask about the CRES' costs and their answer was:
Mr Suthep said yesterday that all the CRES's expenditure was transparent. [...] Mr Suthep, who served as CRES director for a time, conceded he had no actual figures on the centre's expenses.
The government will report to parliament the details of the CRES expenses. He would make all the figures public once the government agencies responsible completed the centre's financial report. The deputy prime minister said he expected the report to be finalised soon as parliament was due to reconvene late next month. [...]
Mr Suthep said the CRES's spending did not include the budget for maintaining military supplies and the vehicles damaged during clashes between security forces and red shirt protesters.
"Deputy PM insists CRES spending above board", Bangkok Post, December 23, 2010
Well, guess we'll have to wait until next year...
P.S.: Nevertheless, the interview was somehow very reminiscent of late prime minister Samak Sundaravej, who had a habit of berating reporters in a blunt way (here's a recent one and here is he in vintage form).
h/t to @thaitvnews for the original video
The Guardian's Latest Thailand-Related WikiLeaks Cables
Originally published at Siam Voices on December 15, 2010 After we have learned what China thought about post-coup Thailand and The Guardian hinting at some cables from the US embassy in Bangkok, the London-based newspaper have uploaded three full Thailand-related documents. Due to it's content, we cannot link to it or quote parts of the cables in it's entirety. We advise to look them up by yourself, unless the Thai authorities have already blocked access to the site. But here's what we can quote:
The first cable (marked 'confidential') is from September 20, 2006 - one day after the military coup - and written by then-US ambassador Ralph L. Boyce about a meeting with coup leader Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin. Key excerpts:
2. (C) I began by asking Sonthi about the audience with [name redacted] last night. Who had attended? He said Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda had brought him, Supreme Commander Ruangroj and Navy Commander Sathiraphan in to meet [name redacted]. Sonthi stressed that they had been summoned to [place redacted]; he had not sought the audience. He said [name redacted] was relaxed and happy, smiling throughout. He provided no further details.
3. (C) Turning to the US reaction, I reminded him of our conversation, August 31, when I told him any military action would result in immediate suspension of assistance programs such as IMET, FMF and numerous others. I told him he could expect us to announce such a measure shortly. He understood. [...]
The International Military Education and Training (IMET), the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and various other programs were reinstated in 2008 (source).
5. (C) Was he going to seize Thaksin's assets? No, he stated flatly. Would Thaksin and his family and colleagues be allowed to return to Thailand? Yes, unconditionally. What is the officially approved English rendition of the coup group's title? "Council for Democratic Reform Under Constitutional Monarchy" or CDRM.
Thaksin's assets were seized at some point anyways and in 2010 the courts decided to keep most of it. The name of the coup group was eventually quickly changed to just "Council for Democratic Reform" in order to avoid misunderstandings.
The second cable (also marked 'confidential') is from October 1, 2008 and protocols a meeting between US ambassador Eric G. John with former prime minister Samak Sundaravej. The PAD have sieged the Government House for several weeks and Samak was disqualified just a shortly before the meeting and also stepped down as the leader of the ruling People's Power Party. The key parts are pretty much what Bangkok Pundit wrote about yesterday. The cable comments that "senior Thai politicians can often revive careers, we believe Samak has lost virtually all of his influence and has little prospect of staging a political comeback."
The last cable (marked 'secret') is from November 6, 2008 and describes several exchanges with insiders with important ties. Remember: at that time, the PAD were still occupying the Government House, since they were willing to take down prime minister Somchai Wongsuwat, Samak's successor and brother-in-law of Thaksin. Note: parts marked with 'XXXXXXXXX' were already reacted during publishing. Key parts:
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that [name redacted] was highly irritated by PAD's occupation of Government House and other disruptions caused by the anti-government group, but [name redacted] was unsure how best to ensure PAD would vacate the compound. [...] XXXXXXXXXXXX considered XXXXXXXXXXXX to be obstinate, however, saying Sondhi had become obsessed with his own sense of mission. By contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that XXXXXXXXXXXX was reasonable and willing to compromise.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that the current turmoil would not result in a military coup. He said that [name redacted], speaking with Army Commander Anupong Paojinda, had referred to the 2006 coup and made a statement to the effect that there should be no further coups. [...]
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX believed PAD continued to aim for a violent clash that would spark a coup. He asserted that he had dined on October 6 with a leading PAD figure, who explained that PAD would provoke violence during its October 7 protest at the parliament. The unnamed PAD figure predicted (wrongly) that the Army would intervene against the government by the evening of October 7. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted to us that PAD remained intent on a conflict that would generate at least two dozen deaths and make military intervention appear necessary and justified.
October 7, 2008 was the day when Somchai was supposed to hold his first speech as the new prime minister at the parliament. The PAD protestors have surrounded the compound and in the following violent clashes with the police, several people were seriously injured and one woman was killed, who is also subject in this cable.
My take: The contents of the leaked cables are highly explosive and will sure confirm what many observers were at least suspecting, but also possibly fuel a more heated controversial debate about the political implications. It is yet to seen if the position of the United States in Thailand will be compromised, considering that they are also in the progress of changing ambassadors. The authorities are sure to block The Guardian's website very quickly, but the spill's been already done and will expand - even if certain circles won't like it, as my fellow blogger Pokpong tweeted earlier today:
http://twitter.com/mrpokpong/status/14795482060554240
Thai Army Chief Announces Crackdown On Lese-Majeste Offenders, Tells Them Not to Whine
Originally published at Siam Voices on October 26, 2010 From today's The Nation:
Army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha warned yesterday that there would be a series of arrests under the lese majeste law, and those arrested shouldn't "whine" because they "should know better".
"Every time there is a gathering [of the red shirts], there are posters and graffiti [against the monarchy]. Let me inform you that we now have evidence and are in the process of making arrests. Do not whine, because we have warned you many times and you are not supposed to do that. If you did it because you didn't know better, then please go ask your parents. If your parents don't know then go ask those who are above them. From our grandparents' generation down to the present, we have been looked after by the monarchy, no matter which king. (...)
"Let me ask, how old are you? I saw that many of you are quite young," he said, referring to those who allegedly wrote the anti-monarchist messages in public areas. "Are you aware of what you are doing? You ought to reflect upon yourselves and your parents if they have benefited from the King's grace or not. If not, then there have been many others who have benefited... Those who have committed these wrongs should be punished. We have [evidence] in websites, posters and graffiti. We have all the pictures and we must see when they will be persecuted."
"Army chief warns of arrests over lese majeste", The Nation, October 26, 2010
General Prayuth partly refers to the anti-monarchy graffiti that were written during the red shirts protests from September 19 of this year. Many of them were written on a large billboard at the construction site of the heavily destroyed Central World shopping mall, displaying in large font the slogans "Everything will be alright".
This announcement also is another evidence for an increasing outspokenness and political activity of the commander-in-chief since he was promoted at the beginning of this month. Unlike his predecessor General Anupong Paochinda, who hesitated to make broad public political announcements, General Prayuth has been very keen to point out that the task to protect the monarchy is paramount and "to [get] rid of some individuals who violate the institution" - which is clearly evident by today's announcement.
Paul L. Quaglia undermines this in a recent story in the Wall Street Journal. Key excerpt:
In the short term, the military's influence on civilian governance could be positive and stabilizing. Prime Minister Abhisit has so far proven a lame-duck leader. (...) This governance vacuum worries many Thais, who see an unstable global economic recovery and a strengthening baht. Political instability is also a concern, given that red-shirt demonstrations in Bangkok have restarted, and former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has announced that he will manage the opposition Puea Thai Party's campaign in the next election.
That makes General Prayuth's recent statement that he would not hesitate to use force to "protect the monarchy" or "to ensure order" more than just a statement of military intent. For many Thais, "order" is what they are longing for. (...)
That may be the kind of leadership that General Prayuth aims to provide, although his personal political views are unclear. He has not discussed elections or the government's plans for political "reconciliation" with disaffected pro-democracy supporters. But if Thai history teaches one thing, it's that Thais should be wary of anyone who promises to restore order. Democratic reform, governance transparency and public accountability could be the casualties.
"The Thai Army Stands Up", by Paul L. Quaglia, Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2010
Also, in a separate announcement on Monday regarding the upcoming visit by UN secretary-general Ban-Ki Moon, General Prayuth has warned not to hold any political gatherings since there's (still) a state of emergency in the capital, urging would-be offenders to think about the country's image - an clear image that the commander-in-chief may have in mind, but cannot possibly except from everybody to agree with him.
Survey: Thai Army Should Not Be Influenced By Politics
Originally published at Siam Voices on October 12, 2010 On Sunday the Suan Dusit University has released the results of yet another survey, this time under the title of "The army in the public eye" ("ทหาร ในสายตาประชาชน") and 2,408 people have been asked between October 6 - 9. This ties in with the recent promotion of General Prayuth Chan-ocha to commander-in-chief.
Before we take a look at the numbers, I'd advise you to read Bangkok Pundit's general disclaimer about opinion polls.
Here are some of the most interesting bits:
1.1 The public opinion on the army today towards politics: A. There is political intervention. / The army is being dragged into political matters more. 55,16 % (!) B. The army must have a clear stance and show no political ambiguity. 24,33% C. They have a very close relationship to politicians. 20,51% ... 2. Regarding the most recent bombings, what role in resolving this issue do you want to see the army in? A. To cooperate with the police in surveillance in order to protect the country from any ill will. 40.48% B. Better surveillance of military weapons. 30.34% C. Better intelligence. 18.11% D. To advice the public about the weapons/explosives and inform how to spot suspicious objects. 11.07%
3. How do you want the military take part in the national reconciliation efforts? A. To be neutral and listen to all sides in order to find a suitable solution. 45.68% B. To clarify and explain the advantages and disadvantages to the public, in order to avoid becoming a tool of an individual or a group. 29.65% C. To resolve and suppress those who have bad intentions towards the country. 14.89% (!) D. The army must show unity in order to be a good role model to society. 9.78% ... 6. What does the army need to fix the most? A. No interventions by politics. 49.19% (!) B. Neglecting of weapons smuggling. 26.51% C. Abuse of authority. 13.86% (!) D. Bad behaving soldiers. 10.44%
"“ทหาร” ในสายตาประชาชน", Dusit Poll, October 10, 2010
The most puzzling aspects of this survey is the the question the interference of politics in the army (marked with a "!"). The results of the survey seriously want to suggest us that there is too much intervention by politics in the military?!
Undelivered Ukrainian APCs and German Weapon Exports to Thailand
Originally published on Siam Voices on September 13, 2010. In 2007 the military interim government has announced the purchase of 96 BTR-3E1 armored personnel carriers (APCs) worth THB 4bn (about $117m). And how many have been delivered to Thailand until now? None! The reasons were supposedly that the engines by German manufacturers Deutz tend to overheat.
But apart from the technical problems made in Germany according to Thai news sources there were also political ones.
Army representatives told ministers that the German government decided not to sell Deutz engines to Ukraine for the APCs because of Berlin's policy of not selling armament to any country subject to political unrest, according to the source.
"Cabinet backs purchase of APCs from Ukraine", by Piyanart Srivalo, Satien Viriyapanpongsa & Samatcha Hoonsara, The Nation, September 8, 2010
However, the Thai government has cited additional reasons why the Germans refused to deliver the engines:
Deputy Prime Minister Trairong Suwannakiri said he had learned that a Muslim organisation had asked Germany not to sell the engines for the APCs because the vehicles could be used in suppression of Muslims in Thailand's deep South.
"Cabinet backs purchase of APCs from Ukraine", by Piyanart Srivalo, Satien Viriyapanpongsa & Samatcha Hoonsara, The Nation, September 8, 2010
The policy mentioned has been adopted by the whole European Union (EU), as it has been pointed out by the German government in an answer to a minor interpellation by opposition MPs (PDF here, it is a really interesting read for those who can read German), it states in particular:
1. Each Member State shall assess the export licence applications made to it for items on the EU Common Military List mentioned in Article 12 on a case-by-case basis against the criteria of Article 2. [...]
Article 2 - Criteria
2. Criterion Two: Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law.
- Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States shall:
(a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression; [...]
- Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law, Member States shall:
(c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
3. Criterion Three: Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.
Member States shall deny an export licence for military technology or equipment which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.Source: "COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008: defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment" (PDF)
Taking the criteria into consideration any EU member country would find a case against Thailand and looking into the arms export reports of the German government, there were indeed rejected requests of arms exports to Ukraine in 2006 (PDF, page 23), 2007 (PDF, page 21) and 2008 (PDF, page 18), but no details were given about what was rejected and how much it was worth.
Additionally in 2007, the German government has also rejected requested exports to Thailand - again, it is unknown what was rejected and how much it was worth it.
However, despite all the political doubts and delivery delays, it did not stop the current government to make the sensible decision to order more - 121 additional APCs to be precise. But there'll be some changes made from the original order:
The head of the Army's ordnance department told Cabinet a recent test showed the MTU engine was of better quality than the Deutz unit. He also said a contract term allowed the Thai side to cancel the deal if any of the delivered vehicles did not meet standard requirements.
"Cabinet backs purchase of APCs from Ukraine", by Piyanart Srivalo, Satien Viriyapanpongsa & Samatcha Hoonsara, The Nation, September 8, 2010
The Thais want the better MTU engines in their new APCs, even though MTU is a German company. What is even more stunning is that during the weekend the Ukrainian ambassador to Thailand came out and gave an exact delivery date for the first units, which is this Friday. Also:
"The Thai military, in conjunction with us, selected the MTU Mercedes," [Ambassador] Chuchuk said. "It has better specifications than the original engine - better speed and acceleration - and we conducted tests and trials witnessed by the Thai military, and they were satisfied."
"First Ukrainian APCs here on Friday", Bangkok Post, September 12, 2010
Just to recap, the original Deutz engine, made in Germany, were not delivered because of political concerns by the German government. The new engines are by MTU, also made in Germany. What's the difference here?
When the first APCs will arrive in Thailand, a small chapter in the ongoing secret stories of arms procurement will be closed for now. But it is accompanied by other dubious army purchases such as grounded airships, jet fighters and the classic bogus GT200 device.
One last question: Why is the Thai army in a rush to buy over 100 more APCs with the first batch barely delivered? Possible answer:
The source said [Commander-in-chief] Gen Anupong wanted to push through the purchase of the additional 121 APCs before he retires in September.
"Army wants more APCs from Ukraine", by Wassana Nanuam, Bangkok Post, July 27, 2010
Thailand's Generals Play Musical Chairs - Part 2
Note: This post has been originally published on August 3, 2010 in series of guest blogger posts for Bangkok Pundit at AsianCorrespondent. This is the second part in a two-part series on the upcoming military command reshuffle. In part one, James Harriman has reflected on the new ranks below the commander-in-chief. Today, this post highlights the aspirants on the top army post.
Every September is the time where the Thai military faces the annual game of musical chairs, where the many high-ranking generals are eager for a promotion. With the upcoming retirement of the current commander-in-chief Gen Anupong Paochinda, the question of the successor reveals the still substantial political weight of the kingdom's highest ranking soldier.
But this year though, September can't come fast enough for some.
In fact, Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon has already set July 20 as the deadline for commanders of the armed forces to send in their reshuffle lists to the defence permanent secretary, Gen Apichart Penkitti. These lists could even be in Gen Prawit's hands before the month ends. According to the schedule, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva should be able to send the names for royal endorsement within August.
"Democrats In A Rush To Anoint Prayuth", by Wassana Nanuam, Bangkok Post, July 15, 2010
The government's favorite candidate for the top post is Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha, currently deputy commander-in-chief and a graduate of class 12 of the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School - this is where all future top commanders go through.
Like in many aspects in Thai society, interpersonal relationships and affiliation play a big role in determining the status of a person and his or her chances of being promoted.
To understand the importance of personal relationships and the graduation years inside the army to ascend through the ranks, I recommend reading Paul Chamber's lengthy, but in-depth essay on New Mandala. It also contains a handy list of all the current top army officers.
As Chambers has pointed out, Gen Anupong and Gen Prayuth were ex-commanders of the 21st Infranty Batallion of the Second Army Division, more commonly known as the "Queen's Guard" - a highly influential military unit that also have played a decisive part in the military crackdown against the anti-government red shirt protesters on May 19. This unit has also over the decades been actively supported by Privy Council president Gen Prem Tinsulanond.
Getting back to the government's intentions, one has to look back at the most recent red shirts protests. It is reported that the relationship between prime minister Abhisit had its rough patches since Gen Anupong has shown some hesitation to move against the protesters, while Gen Prayuth has maintained and even improved his ties to the government during the protests, so a promotion to the top rank can be seen as a reward for him.
With the potential appointment of Gen Prayuth comes also a long list of aspirants that are expected to take the seats below him. James Harriman has reflected on that aspect yesterday.
Even though the promotion for Gen Prayuth is almost certain, there are some musings that he might face some competition. Gen Piroon Phaeopolsong, currently army chief-of-staff, is considered to be the dark horse in the race for the next commander-in-chief.
In late July, Matichon Weekly has listed three reasons that could favor him for the top spot: Firstly, Gen Piroon hails from the same cavalry unit as Gen Prem, who himself would like to see one his of kind becoming commander-in-chief (แถมทั้งมีแรงดันจากบ้านสี่เสาเทเวศร์ ที่อยากให้ พล.อ.พิรุณ ซึ่งเป็นทหารม้าลูกป๋า ขึ้นเป็น ผบ.ทบ. สร้างประวัติศาสตร์ให้ทหารม้า มาเป็น ผบ.ทบ. อีกสักคน หลังจากที่ทหารม้าซบเซามาตั้งแต่หมดยุคป๋าเปรม). Also, as both Matichon Weekly and the Bangkok Post (already last year) have pointed out:
Another advantage of Gen Piroon, who has advanced in his career from the cavalry, is that he is regarded as one of Gen Prem Tinsulanonda's proteges. The president of the Privy Council banked on Gen Piroon to make his dream of seeing the set-up of the new 3rd Cavalry Division in Khon Kaen come true. Gen Prem had reportedly made a remark to leading soldiers that, "If I see the 3rd Cavalry Division before I die, I will die peacefully.''
"PM Abhisit, Gen Prayuth and their common future", by Wassana Nanuam, Bangkok Post, December 12, 2009
Secondly, the 2nd Cavalry Division is regarded as one of the leading forces behind the storm on the red shirt protest site from the Sala Daeng area (the Silom intersection) and Gen Piroon, because of his role as army chief-of-staff and his cavalry origins, is regarded as one of the masterminds (กำลังทหารม้าจากกองพลทหารม้าที่ 2 รักษาพระองค์ (พล.ม.2 รอ.) ก็กลายเป็นพระเอก เพราะเป็นกำลังหลักในการบุกเข้ากระชับพื้นที่ด่านศาลาแดง ด่านใหญ่ที่สุดของคนเสื้อแดงที่เชื่อว่าอันตรายที่สุด ซึ่งก็มี พล.อ.พิรุณ ซึ่งเป็นทหารม้าในฐานะ เสธ.ทบ. ก็มีส่วนร่วมวางแผน ).
And lastly, Matichon names the 'Buriram connection' as a factor favoring Piroon, since he hails from the north-eastern province - same as influential and powerful politicians like Newin Chinchob, leader of the Bhumjaithai Party (key coalition partner of the government) and whose relatives are regional power brokers. (สิ่งที่ทำให้ พล.อ.พิรุณ ถูกจับตามองขึ้นมา ทั้งๆ ที่แรงแผ่ว ก็คือ "บุรีรัมย์ คอนเน็กชั่น" ด้วยเพราะเหตุที่เป็นคนบุรีรัมย์ เช่นเดียวกับนักการเมืองคนสำคัญ และฮ็อตที่สุด มีเพาเวอร์ที่สุดในยุคนี้ อย่าง นายเนวิน ชิดชอบ แกนนำพรรคภูมิใจไทย แถมซ้ำมีเครือญาติที่เป็นกำลังหลักในพื้นที่ของนายเนวิน).
Out of all three factors, the 'Buriram connection' appears to be weakest argument, since no political party has a say in military issues except the Democrat Party. Nevertheless, Piroon's Isaan origin could make him a more 'agreeable' candidate among all political factions in contrast to Gen Prayuth, who has not made big efforts to hide his opposition to Thaksin.
Also, Gen Piroon is a graduate of class 10, same as current commander-in-chief Gen Anupong - who is actually reported to favor Piroon to become his successor (ตัว พล.อ.อนุพงษ์ เองก็ไม่ขัดข้องหากเพื่อนรักที่เขาขุนมากับมือ จะขึ้นมาเป็น ผบ.ทบ. ก่อนปีหนึ่ง).
One factor that speaks in favor of Prayuth is that, since he is a class 12 graduate, his retirement will be in 2014. Piroon on the other hand, can only be commander-in-chief for one year. So, it is more likely that he will be pushed to be chairman of the Royal Army Advisory Board, a position that has little influence in the ranks.
So, in the more than likely event that Gen Prayuth becomes commander-in-chief, it will be seen as a further attempt to strengthen the ties between the Democrat-led government and the armed forces. The irony is though that with the impending dissolution case of Democrat Party, the next commander-in-chief will survive the current government and with a new one, the game of musical chairs starts anew.
Further reading & sources:
- Bangkok Post: Democrats in a rush to anoint Prayuth
- Bangkok Post: PM Abhisit, Gen Prayuth and their common future
- Bangkok Post: There's no sitting on the fence for Class 10 alumni
- Bangkok Post: Two key units tighten grip on armed forces
- Matichon Weekly: "ประยุทธ์" ยึด ผบ.ทบ. โผทหารฉบับ "เสือตะวันออก" จับตา "ป๋าป๊อก" กับความฝันหลังเกษียณ (paywall alert!)
- Paul Chambers: The challenges for Thailand’s arch-royalist military
Talk on Thai Politics and Military at Payap University, Chiang Mai
The Thai and Southeast Asian Studies Program at Payap University is proud to announce the following special lecture as part of "PAYAP PRESENTS," a regular lecture series (in English) featuring scholars working on Southeast Asia. FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
"Thailand in Crisis: Resurgent Military, Diminished Democracy, and Future Possibilities"
Speaker: Paul Chambers, Ph.D.
One of the foremost experts on civil-military relations in Southeast Asia, Dr. Chambers is concurrently Senior Research Fellow, Politics Institute, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany, and Senior Researcher, the Thai and Southeast Asian Studies Program, Payap University, Chiang Mai, Thailand.
When: Thursday, 8 July 2010
Time: 5pm to 6pm
Room 317, Pentecost Building (formerly the Graduate and International Studies Building), Mae Khao Campus (behind Carrefour), Payap University
Overview of talk:
Thailand's political winds are blowing ever stronger as forces either defending the status quo or seeking change brace themselves for an imminent critical juncture. The growing partisan divide has facilitated greater military incisions over civilian decision-making domains, bestowing a preponderance of power upon soldiers as opposed to elected representatives. The result has been an erosion of democracy amidst already-intensified political instability. Though the military is not monolithically supportive of either side, the far majority of soldiers (especially those in positions of power) are inclined toward the status quo. In this presentation, Dr. Chambers examines contemporary civil-military relations in Thailand, the state of unity in the Thai armed forces, and potential political outcomes. He argues that, with enhanced uncertainty hanging in the air, Thai politics remain extremely fluid, the only surety being a heightened political role for Thailand's military.
Please note that there is a new PAYAP PRESENTS website where you can find more information about this talk as well as past and future talks: http://ic.payap.ac.th/pp
Chambers: The Challenges for Thailand’s Military
New Mandala has posted a guest article by Paul Chambers, a senior research fellow at the University of Heidelberg, Germany and an expert on civil-military relations in southeast Asia, about the Thai military and its upcoming challenges. Key excerpt:
In the aftermath of the May 19 victory over the Red Shirts and Thaksin, Thailand’s military officer corps appears united above, but fissured below. (...) But the perils facing the Queen's Guard will be less likely to arise from Thailand’s elected civilian governments given their temporary and frail character—especially with Thaksin still on the run. Rather, the clique’s greatest challenge will be to diminish internal military resentment from junior officers and thus ensure its enhanced control over the armed forces. If Prem and Surayud successfully balance various military classes to perpetuate Queen’s Guard military control, then some semblance of unity within an arch-royalist armed forces may well persevere. Yet if such balancing is not undertaken or proves unsuccessful, then internal military divisions could become increasingly violent."The challenges for Thailand’s arch-royalist military", by Paul Chambers, New Mandala, June 9, 2010
Chambers give a very detailed account into the structure of the army's current top command line, its origin and what lies ahead. I recommend you to read it.